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The successful, non-violent democratic transition and consolidation in Spain has been 
the subject of many studies and there is a literature that suggests that Spain's case may be a 
valid model for the countries of Central and Eastern Europe as each proceeds toward 
democratization and capitalism in different ways. Hungary is used as the representative 
country ofthe former Soviet-influenced bloc because of many similarities historically in the 
twentieth century and likenesses in the phases a country experienced as it attempts to 
consolidate democratic and capitalistic institutions. An in-depth study of the Spanish 
case-including the pre-transition, transition, and consolidation phases-is undertaken to 
describe the complex changes that took place in Spain during this painstaking process. The 
Hungarian case study consists of a look at the pre-transition and transition phases only, as the 
consolidation phase only began in June of 1994. The final stage of this study takes the two 
cases and draws conclusions by comparing and contrasting the changes that have occurred 
in each of the phases. This thesis calls attention to the specific methods used in each case and 
demonstrates that, although there are many similarities between the two cases, Spain's case 
is in fact not a model for Hungary or the other Central and Eastern European countries. 
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The new order in Central and Eastern Europe since 1989 is an event that most Cold 
Warriors assumed would never happen. The balance of power in the bipolar East-West 
confrontation had become "business-as-usual" and, therefore, the collapse of the Soviet Union 
shocked everyone. Perhaps ifthe events that led to the break up ofthe Warsaw Pact had 
been forecast, the western countries would have been better prepared to deal with the 
problems that face the old Soviet bloc after they emerged from 70 years of communism and 
Soviet hegemony. 
There is a literature that suggests Spain's process of instituting democracy and 
capitalism is a model for these newly emerging countries, and, more specifically, for Hungary 
because of the many similarities in their modern histories. The purpose of this thesis is to 
look closely at the successful consolidation in Spain and then apply that model to the 
Hungarian scenario to see if in fact the Spanish model is or is not relevant for use in Hungary. 
This comparative study could determine the path in which the Hungarian government may 
wish to proceed or avoid to achieve a successful consolidation of democracy and capitalism. 
An in-depth study of the Spanish transition is undertaken, to include important events 
and processes from the period of the Franco dictatorship that helped to prepare the course 
of change after General Franco died in 197 5. A model of elite settlement is employed to 
assist in understanding the role of elites during the transition, in which the King played a 
critical role. The political process, the most intense and important part of the Spanish 
transition, is analyzed from the perspective of the political elites and their ability to achieve 
success through the process of negotiated consensus. This process of joining together a few 
individuals from the ruling government and the political parties was extremely effective in 
obtaining decisions on controversial issues that affected the developmental outcome of the 
political processes forming the constitutional monarchy that now governs their country. The 
elite settlement model argues that the "profound transformation of Spain's political elites from 
X1 
disunity into consensual unity" led to the successful democratization of Spain. The significant 
political elites gave strength and legitimacy to the government after July 1976 by supporting 
the policies that had been negotiated amongst themselves. Mutual respect for political 
opponents is, for the first time in modern Spanish history, virtually universal among elites at 
the core of the political system. Aside from respect and friendship among political elites, an 
elite consensus was also seen as a successful negotiating tool in forming policy for business 
and economics, the military, and the church. The political elites and the monarchy were the 
cornerstone to the success ofthe Spanish transition. 
The Spanish study will go beyond the transition phase to look at the importance of 
consolidation, or securing the structural, attitudinal, and behavioral dimensions of the new 
democratic processes so that the country is not threatened or destabilized. The Spanish 
Socialists have been in power for the last dozen years and have taken on this task of 
consolidation by reforming key portions of the countries infrastructure to modifY the 
atmosphere so that the people are comfortable with and trust their government. By achieving 
these changes, the Spanish democracy is not threatened by any internal restlessness that could 
lead to coup d'etat or revolution from below. 
Hungary, just beginning the consolidation process, is compared to Spain by using the 
points that were developed in the study of the Spanish case. As in Spain, the pre-transition 
phase is studied to see if the two countries began their respective transitions from roughly the 
same starting point. The transition that Hungary undertook is then compared to the Spanish 
case and those areas that are of a dissimilar nature are discussed seeking insight into whether 
or not this particular issue is of importance to successful consolidation. In addition, the areas 
of similarity are expanded to forecast where they will go if Hungary's path is similar to that 
of Spain. The last possibility is an area where an issue that was found to be important in 
Spain is not present in Hungary and, in this case, the issue is looked at to see what migl}t be 
done to correct the problem or what the outcome may be if this issue is overlooked. 
The conclusion will look at the two case studies to determine when, or if, Hungary 
xu 
will become a consolidated, capitalistic democracy. Spain's real integration into the 
international community came as consolidation began in 1982, not during the transition phase 
as many of the Central/Eastern European countries are seeking today. In addition to the 
consolidation issues, some prospects for the future are proposed as these countries near the 
beginning ofthe twenty-first century. 
Xlll 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The new order in Central and Eastern Europe since 1989 is an event that most Cold 
Warriors assumed would never happen. The balance of power in the bipolar East-West 
confrontation had become "business-as-usual" and, therefore, the collapse of the Soviet Union 
shocked everyone. Perhaps if the events that led to the break up of the Warsaw Pact had 
been forecast, the western countries would have been better prepared to deal with the 
problems that face the old Soviet bloc after they emerged from 70 years of communism and 
Soviet hegemony. 
There is a literature that suggests Spain's process of instituting democracy and 
capitalism is a model for these newly emerging countries, and, more specifically, for Hungary 
because of the many similarities in their modern histories. 1 The purpose of this thesis is to 
look closely at the successful consolidation in Spain and then apply that model to the 
Hungarian scenario to see if in fact the Spanish model is or is not relevant for use in Hungary. 
This comparative study could determine the path in which the Hungarian government may 
wish to proceed or avoid to achieve a successful consolidation of democracy and capitalism. 
An in-depth study of the Spanish transition will be undertaken, to include important 
events and processes from the period ofthe Franco dictatorship that helped to prepare the 
course of change after General Franco died in 1975. A model of elite settlement will be 
employed to assist in understanding the role of elites during the transition, 2 in which the King 
played a critical role. The political process, the most intense and important part of the 
Spanish transition, will be analyzed from the perspective of the political elites and their ability 
1 Some of the authors making various points along these lines are Kenneth Maxwell, Juan 
J. Linz, Alfred Stepan, Eric Hershberg, Andras Boz6ki, Andras Korosenyi, and George Schopflin. 
2 See Richard Gunther, "Spain: The Very Model of the Modern Elite Settlement," in 
John Higley and Richard Gunther, eds., Elites and Democratic Consolidation in Latin America 
and Southern Europe (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 38-80. 
1 
to achieve success through the process of negotiated consensus. This process of joining 
together a few individuals from the ruling government and the political parties was extremely 
effective in obtaining decisions on controversial issues that affected the developmental 
outcome of the political processes forming the constitutional monarchy that now governs their 
country. The elite settlement model argues that the "profound transformation of Spain's 
political elites from disunity into consensual unity"3 led to the successful democratization of 
Spain. The significant political elites gave strength and legitimacy to the government after 
July 1976 by supporting the policies that had been negotiated amongst themselves. "Mutual 
respect for political opponents is, for the first time in modern Spanish history, virtually 
universal among elites at the core of the political system. . . . "4 Aside from respect and 
fiiendship among political elites, an elite consensus was also seen as a successful negotiating 
tool in forming policy for business and economics, the military, and the church. The political 
elites and the monarchy were the cornerstone to the success of the Spanish transition. 
The Spanish study will go beyond the transition phase to look at the importance of 
consolidation, or securing the structural, attitudinal, and behavioral dimensions of the new 
democratic processes so that the country is not threatened or destabilized. 5 The Spanish 
Socialists have been in power for the last dozen years and have taken on this task of 
consolidation by reforming key portions of the countries infrastructure to modify the 
atmosphere so that the people are comfortable with and trust their government. By achieving 
these changes, the Spanish democracy is not threatened by any internal restlessness that could 
lead to coup d'etat or revolution from below. 
3 Gunther, "Spain: The Very Model ofthe Modern Elite Settlement," 40. 
4 Ibid., 40 
5 Aspects of consolidation as presented by Juan J. Linz and Alfred Stepan, "Democratic 
Transition and Consolidation in Southern Europe," (Unpublished draft of book chapter): 3. 
2 
Hungary, just beginning the consolidation process, will be compared to Spain by using 
the points that were developed in the study of the Spanish case. As in Spain, the pre-
transition phase will be studied to see if the two countries began their respective transitions 
from roughly the same starting point. The transition that Hungary undertook will be 
compared to the Spanish case and those areas that are of a dissimilar nature will be discussed 
seeking insight into whether or not this particular issue is of importance to successful 
consolidation. In addition, the areas of similarity will be expanded to forecast where they will 
go ifHungary's path is similar to that of Spain. The last possibility is an area where an issue 
that was found to be important in Spain is not present in Hungary and, in this case, the issue 
will be looked at to see what might be done to correct the problem or what the outcome may 
be if this issue is overlooked. 
The conclusion will look at the two case studies to determine when, or if, Hungary 
will become a consolidated, capitalistic democracy. Spain's real integration into the 
international community came as consolidation began in 1982, not during the transition phase 
as many of the Central/Eastern European countries are seeking today. In addition to the 
consolidation issues, some prospects for the future are proposed as these countries near the 
beginning of the twenty-first century. 
3 
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II. FRANCO: LEADING SPAIN FROM CIVIL WAR 
The Spanish Second Republic was a total failure. Upon its arrival in April 1931, the 
people of Spain cheered, not for the concept of the new liberal democracy, but for the 
beginning of the government that they hoped would end the oppression of the past 
monarchies and dictatorships. They looked forward to a government that would help the 
people instead of the Church, the army, the aristocracy, and the landowners. The streets were 
filled with people celebrating and shouting, ";Viva Ia Repzlblica!" 1 
The leaders of the Republic were men who saw Spain's problems through their 
knowledge ofthe writings of the Generaci6n de/98, and hoped to stop the national decline 
that had been a main theme of those authors. Politics was not a strong suit of these 
republicans and when their eloquent schemes did not produce significant progress, they were 
at a loss of how to produce a policy that would achieve success. The constitution was hastily 
written, quickly approved, and the language was too ambiguous; its direct attack on the 
Catholic Church and lack of authority for regional autonomy were poorly received by the 
masses. In the five years of the Second Republic, it alienated most of the Spanish population. 
This alienation resulted in the three-year Spanish Civil War, a war of bloody fighting that 
killed hundreds of thousands. The war began in July 1936 and pitted the Republicans against 
the rival Nationalists, fighting under the auspices of the Spanish Falange Party founded by 
Jose Antonio Primo de Rivera in 1933. As the leadership ofthe Falange were killed in the 
early days of the fighting, General Francisco Franco emerged and was left to assume the 
leadership of Spain as the war ended in April1939. 
General Franco assumed final control of Spain amid the turmoil that engulfed Europe. 
The equipment sent to Spain by the Soviets, Italians, and Germans provided important battle 
testing for what was to come in Europe. Adolf Hitler's Germany was threatening all of 
1 Jose Amodia, Franco's Political Legacy: From Dictatorship to Fa~ade Democracy 
(London: Penguin, 1977), 13. 
5 
Europe with the Second World War, leaving few eyes on the events in Spain. This allowed 
Franco time to legitimize his rule within Spain without the watchful eye of his neighbors in 
Europe or across the Atlantic. 
A. EMERGENCE OF AUTHORITARIANISM 
Franco's regime emerged as a government that opposed much of what the Second 
Republic had promised. The Nationalist victors showed no mercy toward the defeated 
Republicans; they were captured and imprisoned, exiled, or executed. Hundreds of thousands 
received life in prison and estimates claim 200,000 death sentences were handed down and 
carried out in the years after the war? The new dictatorial system would eliminate all that 
resembled the old government and introduce their new system that would be the future of the 
Spanish nation, ruled by General Franco as "Caudillo by the grace of God, as his coins 
proclaimed. "3 He would capitalize on the failures of the Second Republic while taking on a 
falangist doctrine (basically a quasi-fascist ideology) to develop a set of policies that would 
act as legitimizing forces for the regime. Franco also defined the regime's roots in the past 
glory of Spanish history, eliminating the memories of the decline of the nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries. In addition to its basking in the glory of sixteenth century or Siglo de 
Oro, Franco stressed his strong opposition to communism, turned the deadly Civil War into 
a positive referent by terming it as the Christian Crusade against the incompetent, atheist 
2 Richard Herr, An Historical Essay on Modem Spain (Berkeley: University of California 
Press, 1974), 212. 
3 Eric D. Solsten and Sandra W. Meditz, Spain: A Country Study (Washington, D.C.: 
U.S. Government Printing Office, 1990), 40. 
6 
leaders that allowed Spain's slide into decadence, and renewed one of the old Falange mottos 
for Spain, "One, great, andfree."4 
One nation was Franco's goal, but Spain is not an homogenous country linguistically 
or culturally. The regime had to overcome the diversity of the various regions through strict 
force and it discouraged any discussion of autonomy by the regions. In his attempt to stamp 
out regional separatism, Franco outlawed regional languages and sent in strong contingents 
ofthe elite Guardia Civil (Civil Guard) to maintain the regime's control within the Basque, 
Catalan, and Galician regions. 
The Catholic Church played an important role in legitimizing Franco's leadership. 
Strong anticlericalism within the Second Republic removed the church from its social, 
political, and educational role in Spain. The provincial clergy in most of Spain welcomed the 
outbreak of the Civil War with open arms, supporting the Nationalist cause throughout. 
Franco reestablished strong ties with the Church soon after the fighting got underway. 
Church leaders openly supported Franco's Nationalists and severely criticized the 
Republicans. In a country that is overwhelmingly catholic, the church !ended credibility to 
the regime through its praise ofFranco and his regime. 
In return, Franco, who was devoted to the Roman Catholic Church, promoted 
Catholicism as the Spanish faith. "Mass was said regularly in the army, often in the open air, 
prelates were conspicuous at public functions, civil marriages and divorces were abolished, 
the crucifix returned to the classroom, and the Jesuits were restored to their property and 
position." 5 The status ofthe Church was restored to that of pre-Republican Spain. 
In the eyes of the Spanish people, this new authoritarian dictatorship was showing 
more promise than the liberal democracy had shown earlier in the decade. Political parties 
were banned, but they had not proven to be of any significant benefit during the Second 
4 John A. Crow, Spain: The Root and the Flower (Berkeley: University of California 
Press, 1985), 348-9. Quote italicized in original text. 
s Herr, An Historical Essay on Modern Spain, 215. 
7 
Republic. The Church had regained its prominence within this very devout congregation of 
Spaniards and the clergy had also returned to its role of educating the population. This new 
government, in many ways, promised to care for its people and that was more than the people 
could say for the Second Republic. But, could this government legitimize its conduct to the 
international community? 
B. INTERNATIONAL ISOLATION 
Franco actually preferred international isolation to wide intervention in the Spanish 
Civil War. Throughout the war, Franco instituted policy to keep intervention by foreign 
governments to a minimum. In order to achieve this, the General, who had been named 
Gemeralisimo andJefe del &tado (Head of State) in October 1936, combined the supportive 
political parties within Spain into one party, formed a ministry, and decreed the first of seven 
Fundamental Laws of his regime. These moves would give an appearance of a democratic 
form of rule and lend legitimacy to a perceived division of power within the government. 
The first move came early in the fighting in April 193 7 when the announcement of the 
creation of a civilian political organization helped to hide the reality of Franco's military 
dictatorship. The Falange Party and the Carlist Traditionalist Party were united into one body 
to be called the Falange Espaiiola Tradicionalista y de las Juntas de Ojensiva Nacionaf 
Sindicalista (FE. T. y de Ia J. O.N.S. ). A decree was issued that stated that this party would 
be the intermediary between society and state, ensuring that there was a direct access to 
exchange the ideas of the people and those of the state. It also declared that the Head of 
State would also act as the National Head of the Falange, thereby placing Franco to its 
leadership. 6 
In the following year, Franco set up a council of minister made up of supporters of 
his cause. The ministers came from the Carlists, Monarchists, Falangists, and military. The 
6 Herr, An Historical Essay on Modem Spain, 214. 
8 
most important minister was Ramon Serrano Sufier, a Falangist and relative of Franco, 
holding the position of Minister of Gobernaci6n (Government). Although all ministers were 
in the new Falange Party, their previous loyalties were often presented in open discussion and 
considered by Franco in his decision, which were only his and final. 
The first Fundamental Law was the Labor Charter (Fuero del Trabajo ), published in 
March 1938. Provided in it was social policy, stressing the mutual obligation of the society 
and the state. All Spaniards had the duty to work, the state would ensure that jobs existed 
for them to work, and organized strikes would be considered treasonous acts against the 
Spanish people. The decree also called for adequate wages to support family life, a limit on 
the hours of work, paid vacation for all workers, and rest on Sundays and holidays. Industry 
was to remain in private hands and both owners and employees would belong to syndicates 
that would ensure cooperation for the good of the nation. 7 
Although it is known that the Soviet Union supported the Republicans while Hitler 
and Mussolini backed the Nationalists, Spain's dictator attempted to remain a neutral 
bystander in the European conflict. When Hitler invaded the Soviet Union, Franco agreed 
to a Falange request to participate and punish the Soviets for their assistance to the 
Republicans. A volunteer division, called the Blue Division, did fight with the Germans until 
they were withdrawn by Franco in November 1943. Franco had concluded earlier, in 1942, 
that the Allies would defeat the Axis powers; so, Franco began to distance himself at that 
time. Spain expelled all Germans and cut all economic ties with Germany while opening 
Spanish airfield and ports to Allied aircraft and ships and allowing Allied intelligence agents 
to operate in Madrid. Jews fleeing the Nazis were allowed to seek asylum in Spain and, after 
the war, Franco offered to extradite German and other Nazi collaborators for trial. The final 
realization of Franco's commitment was in 1944 when the media reported that he had 
7 Solsten and Meditz, Spain, 41-42. 
9 
removed pictures of Hitler and Mussolini from his office and replaced them with one of the 
Pope. 8 
To maintain his hold on power, Franco saw three pillars holding up his regime: the 
Falange, the church, and the army 9 The manner in which Franco gained control of the 
political party in Spain and appeased the Catholic Church have been described. The key to 
his success would be his control of the army, the entity that had the ability to support the 
General and to counter any opposition should it arise. 
C. MILITARY DOMINANCE 
General Franco's support from the army, navy, air force, and civil guard assisted in 
ensuring his assumption of power in Spain; but, also, the Second Republic had disintegrated 
to a position that left it unable to govern. Spaniards were not ready for nor did they 
understand democracy. Conflict was continual and consensus was never achieved, leaving 
a system neither legitimate nor efficient to a majority of the people for a long enough period 
of time to generate any stability. The Republicans, lacking similar support to that which 
Franco received from the Italian and German fascists, were unable to maintain control of the 
country, the Cortes, or the people. Their failure opened the door for the Nationalist 
movement to organize and develop its government as the fighting of the bloody civil war 
raged on until 1939. 
Franco was named the Commander in Chief of the Spanish Nationalist Army when the 
mando unico was introduced and publicized nationally and internationally. Quickly following 
this mandate and as previously mentioned, a decree was distributed pronouncing Franco as 
the Chief of Government of the Spanish State (later changed to Chief of State or Jeje del 
8 Benny Pollack, The Paradox of Spanish Foreign Policy: Spain's International 
Relations from Franco to Democracy (New York: St. Martin's, 1987), 4-13. 
9 Herr, An Historical Essay on Modern Spain, 214. 
10 
£stado) and Generalissimo. Franco was well aware that his power rested in the hands of his 
military peers and the patriotic Nationalists. 10 
On the recommendation of his brother-in-law, Serrano, Franco further increased his 
hold on power by merging the military into the newly consolidated Nationalist political party. 
By including the military with the political patriots, the new party could further promote 
social justice and build support for the Crusade. Military officers were automatically made 
party members and urged to play an active role in promoting party membership inside and 
outside the military. This further aligned the military under Franco's leadership. 
The National Council appointed military officers as ministers to provide direct 
representation of the military in the developing government bureaucracy. Members of the 
first regular Council appointed in 193 8 were divided among military and civilian ministers. 
This structure, another Serrano recommendation, appeared to the international community 
as a regime jointly ruled by civilians and military ministers instead of a military dictatorship. 
This Council, no matter how it appeared to onlookers, remained under strict military and 
falangist influences. 
Throughout the war, the military enforced a state of martial law that remained in effect 
until 1948. Franco repealed all laws of the Second Republic that offended his and his 
supporters beliefs; such as, civil marriages, legal divorces, non-church sponsored education, 
freedom ofthe press, and the holding of public meetings without official permission. Without 
the military's support, to include the Civil Guard, Franco would not have had the power to 
invalidate these laws nor the means to enforce nor punish those violating the repealed laws. 11 
Purges conducted by both sides resulted in the deaths of thousands in the first year of 
the war-and thousand more of republicans and their sympathizers after the war. As 
Nationalist troops occupied previously Republican territories, the prison population grew to 
10 Stanley G. Payne, Politics and the Military in Modem Spain (Stanford: Stanford 
University Press, 1967), 369-374. 
11 Solsten and Meditz, Spain, 45. 
11 
some 300,000 and fell under the control of the military. The 1939 Law of Political 
Responsibilities gave Franco's military the authority to set up tribunals and commence mass 
executions of those guilty of serious offenses and hand down extremely stiff sentences to 
anyone that had questioned the Nationalist liberation of Spain. A quarter of a million 
prisoners were serving sentences in the early 1940s and executions were still common. These 
purges and imprisonments served to further bind the military to Franco and strengthen the 
dictatorship as it emerged from the Civil War. 
General Franco and his regime worked hard from the start to appear democratic so 
that outside influences, other than that of the Soviet Union, Italy, and Germany, would not 
attempt to topple his control in Spain. Franco often said that Spain's democracy was unlike 
all others because the Spanish character makes it incompatible with the Western European 
style of democracy. However, Spain's idiosyncratic democracy, as far as Franco was 
concerned, did not make it any less a democracy-" Espana es diferente" became a popular 
description of the Franco regime by members of his government and, later, it even became a 
tourist slogan. 12 But, Franco knew he had to create a future for his country and, to do so, 
some changes were in order. 
12 Amodia, Franco's Political Legacy, 26. 
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III. THE DICTATOR'S REFORI\1 
Under Franco's rule, Spain changed in many ways. Unfortunately, the improvements 
were not well-balanced across all key areas, such as politics, society, economics, and 
international relations. Political and social change lagged well behind economic success and 
international acceptance. Franco wanted to bring back to Spain the days of glory of the Siglo 
de Oro and rid it of the defeat and decadence in the interim. 
In the early years of the Franco dictatorship, changes were typically reactions to 
instigating, external events. From his role as Head of State, Franco made changes as he saw 
fit, like that of a king over his subjects. With the Spanish economy in ruins, high inflation 
rates, and total isolation, Franco "decided to use more carrot and less stick on his 
subjects-although he always kept the stick handy in case of need." 1 
A. POLITICS 
Franco did not develop an ideology or political theory for Spain, he molded both 
through time to maintain power. He never formulated a true, comprehensive, democratic 
system for Spaniards, but Franco did decree the seven Leyes Fundamentales (Fundamental 
Laws) to give his regime some sense oflegitimacy to the outside world. These Laws were 
a perception of constitutionalism put in place to quiet unrest generated by national needs and 
demands. 
The Fundamental Laws formed an organic democracy in which man is not an 
individual but a member of a community that defines his existence. This man is not allowed 
1 Herr, An Historical Essay on Modern Spain, 237. 
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a vote but his community, i.e., the family, the municipality, the syndicate, is represented as a 
whole. 2 The Laws, in order of promulgation. are: 
I. Labor Charter (1938, modified 1967)-set labor and social policy stressing the 
mutual obligation of the state and its citizens; 
II. Law ofthe Cortes (1942, modified 1946 and 1967)-a parliamentary body 
which acted in an advisory role; 
III. Charter of the Spanish People (1945, modified 1967)-in appearance, a bill of 
rights for Spaniards, but Franco had the right to suspend the Charter 
without justification; 
IV. Law ofReferendum (1945)-provided a means for Spanish citizens to voice 
their opinion on matters of national concern; 
V. Law of Succession (1947, modified 1967)-set the stage for transfer ofpower 
from Franco to the next King, whom Franco would select; 
VI. Law on the Principles ofthe National Movement (1958)-defined the 
institutions of the Government; and 
VII. Organic Law of State ( 1967)-further defined governmental processes. 3 
The process that generated the Laws was more for appearance than for the Spanish people. 
The regime seemed to be instituting truly constitutional ideals while Franco maintained the 
right to make the final decision on all issues. The authoritarian nature of the Franco regime 
was unaltered by the seven Fundamental Laws. 4 
The National Movement, or Movimiento, which grew out of the F.E. T y de Ia 
J.O.NS., was the only recognized political organization in Franco's Spain. Its members were 
from various groups (Falange, Monarchists, Traditionalists, the Church, the military, and 
Opus Dei5) that were loyal to Franco, and they were manipulated by him to keep each entity 
2 E. Ramon Arango, The Spanish Political System: Franco's Legacy (Boulder: 
Westview, 1978), 115-6. 
3 Solsten and Meditz, Spain, 41-43. 
4 Amodia, Franco's Political Legacy, 36-38. 
5 Opus Dei (Work of God) became a political, economic, and social force in Franco's 
government in the late 1950s and was made up of Catholic laymen. See Amodia, Franco's 
Political Legacy, 210-11; Crow, Spain, 354-5; or Solsten and Meditz, Spain, 253-4. 
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satisfied so that there would be no internal challenge to his power. The Movimiento was not 
a political party, but rather an advisory body for Franco that, through the years, became 
extremely bureaucratized and inefficient. There were many opposing goals within the 
membership and, because ofthe diversity of the organization, it could never become a strong 
political force to threaten the power of the regime. 
The Cortes, a single chamber legislative assembly, made up of members having been 
elected, appointed, obtained by position, and indirectly elected by governmental bodies. The 
Cortes, established in 1942, went through various changes in 1946 and again in 1967 that 
were designed to modify what was a gathering of appointees in 1942 to a broad-based, 
elected assembly by 1967.6 The problem was not resolved in that free elections are not 
usually associated with a regime based on authoritarianism. The Cortes was divided into the 
following eight representative groups: 
1) the political group= the entire membership ofthe National Council ofthe 
Movimiento; 
2) the syndicalist group= representatives from the national Syndicalist 
Organization; 
3) the local group= representatives from the municipalities, enclaves, and 
provmces; 
4) the family group= representatives directly elected by the heads of family and 
married women over 21 years of age; 
5) the cultural group= rectors from Spanish universities, academies, and research 
institutes; 
6) the professional group = various professional individuals from industry; 
7) the group of high office holders = all cabinet ministers and presidents of the 
Council of State, ofthe Supreme Court, ofthe Military Justice Council, of 
the Exchequer, and of the National Economic Council; and 
8) the group directly appointed by the Head of State = 25 representatives chosen 
by Franco, usually men who had distinguished themselves in military, 
ecclesiastical or administrative duties. 7 
6 Amodia, Franco's Political Legacy, 95-96. 
7 Arango, The Spanish Political System, 165-9. 
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The Cortes played several roles in the making of Spanish legislation, such as approving bills, 
treaties, and changes to the Fundamental Laws that had been submitted to them by Franco. 
The political structure that Franco put in place gave him absolute power; coordination 
and cooperation from the Movimiento and Cortes were expected. Franco appointed and 
dismissed cabinet ministers at his will and he could do the same with representatives of the 
Cortes and members of the Movimiento. Franco's authority was unquestioned until the 
moment of his death. 
B. ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 
It was in the area of economic development that Franco let his advisors "hagan lo que 
les de Ia gana (do whatever you want to do), "8 allowing them to take the necessary measures 
to repair the fragile economy. The cabinet had a new, younger look in the late 1960s and 
membership in the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF), and the World Bank led Spain down a path that 
eliminated the autarkic policies of the previous twenty years. 
Following a plan set in motion by the French in 1958 to overcome their economic 
slump, the neocapitalist ministers put the 1959 Stabilization Plan in place to respond to the 
lack of planning created by the old system of self-sufficiency. "The plan's objectives were 
twofold: to take the necessary fiscal and monetary measures required to restrict demand and 
to contain inflation, while, at the same time, liberalizing foreign trade and encouraging foreign 
investment. "9 The Stabilization Plan called for the following initiatives: 
- a freeze on wages in the public sector; 
- the reduction of governmental spending; 
8 Arnold Hottinger, "Spain in Transition: Franco's Regime," The Washington Papers 2, 
no. 18 (Beverly Hills and London: Sage, 1974): 24. 
9 Solsten and Meditz, Spain, 142. 
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- the tightening of commercial credit; 
- the reform oftax laws to increase revenue and reduce demand; 
- the gradual elimination of subsidies to marginal producers; and 
-the abandonment of multiple exchange rates and the adoption of a single 
exchange rate. 10 
The Plan's implementation caused further recession and unemployment; however, as the 
ministers had envisaged, Spain's economy exploded in the 1960s as imports fell, exports rose, 
and the Spanish people went back to work. Some worked in the industrial centers of Spain 
and some left for Western Europe, both creating beneficial economic outcomes in Spain, but, 
as discussed in the next section (Social Reformation), this migration for work had a 
detrimental outcome as Spaniards sought social freedoms. 
Businesses were enticed to participate in the Plan by receiving benefits in the form of 
tax advantages, depreciation allowances, availability of credit, preferential allocation of raw 
materials, and incentives for relocation into underdeveloped regions. 11 Most supported the 
Plan and its benefits with enthusiasm once they understood the new system and discarded the 
old autarky of the past two decades. 
As the Spanish economy was transformed into its modified free-market system, the 
country experienced massive industrialization and prosperity. Foreign aid and credits, 
remittances of Spanish workers abroad, and direct foreign investment provided billions of 
dollars to the economy while Spanish goods were widely exported to markets in Western 
Europe and the United States. The government channeled investment in several key areas 
such as auto assembly, electronics, petrochemicals, steel, utilities, metallurgy, construction, 
air transport, and tourism. In short order, Spain was ranked in the top ten worldwide in ship 
10 Arango, The Spanish Political System, 143. 
11 Ibid., 145. 
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building, steel production, fish catch, tourism, auto exports, and production of wine, oranges, 
olive oil, and cork. 12 
Franco's economic miracle certainly helped Spain, since it became industrialized and 
relatively affluent; by 1973, Spain's per capita income was over $2,000, ahead of Ireland, 
Greece, and Portugal .. However, the absence of creating a substantial economic infrastructure 
and of reducing the dependence on foreign capital hindered continued growth. Additionally, 
other areas that needed serious attention were the few banks that influenced and controlled 
all of Spain's investment capital, the inadequate housing and municipal services in expanded 
industrial zones, and the income imbalances throughout the country. The door to economic 
stability was opened by General Franco, but, as might be expected of an authoritarian 
dictator, the door was never fully opened to the market-it was limited by a broad variety of 
price and exchange controls and a high degree of industrial regulation, trade protection, and 
artificial price supports. 13 
C. SOCIAL REFORMATION 
Societal change during the Franco Era was a result of, but not as successful as, the 
"economic miracle." Economic development was a goal ofthe Franco regime that resulted 
in unplanned, but inevitable, social unrest. As advances were made economically, the 
growing middle class slowly achieved social modifications, because, within an authoritarian 
regime, social evolution is curbed to maintain stability. The changes were haphazard and at 
a snail's pace. 
Population movements may have had the largest effect on social change. This was a 
result ofworkers moving from rural to urban settings, of workers going abroad for higher 
12 Crow, Spain, 380. 
13 Stanley G. Payne, The Franco Regime: 1936-1975 (Madison, Wise.: University of 
Wisconsin Press, 1987), 488-93. 
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wages, and oftremendous growth in visiting foreign tourists. Population concentration and 
exposure to Western European ideals, along with a growing number of younger Spaniards 
that felt no attachment to the regime, caused the citizenry by reason of these new social 
situations to question the lack of freedoms that they possessed in comparison to other 
Europeans. 
The people obtained refonns to the education system. Demonstrations at universities 
forced action on the part of the regime to revamp the admissions process, permit more 
liberties to students and faculty, and increase pay for teachers throughout the country. The 
number of universities increased and, between 1960 and 1972, enrollment more than tripled 
to 241,000. 14 Higher education was not the only problem, so the l\llinistry ofEducation put 
forth the Law on Education in 1969 to answer to the problems in primary and secondary 
education. IS Primary education became obligatory and illiteracy was reduced. Secondary 
education became optional, but those not attending were required to enroll in vocational 
programs. This better prepared young Spaniards for the workforce if schooling was not an 
option, whether for financial or personal reasons. 
On the issue of individual rights, there is some question to the freedoms afforded the 
Spanish people. The Charter of Spanish People passed in 1945, a sort of bill of rights, 
provides rights while putting strict conditions on the freedom of using the rights. Along with 
these rights is the requirement of "loyalty to the Head of State, obedience to the laws, 
compulsory military service, and the obligation to pay taxes." 16 Although guaranteed, often 
other laws or articles restricted the freedoms to such an extent that the Government could 
question and restrict individual rights to whatever level desired. The method of doing so was 
written into the Charter. Article 33 states that "the exercise of rights recognized by this 
14 Solsten and Meditz, Spain, 121-2. 
1s Amodia, Franco's Political Legacy, 34. 
16 Ibid., 177-9. 
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Charter may not go against the spiritual, national and social unity of Spain," 17 and Article 3 5 
goes on to say that certain rights "may be temporarily suspended by the Government by 
means of a decree which must state clearly the scope and duration of such a measure. "18 So, 
with a simple declaration, a state of emergency for the nation or a region could be declared 
and the rights of the citizens revoked. The Charter was better at protecting the regime's 
power that the individual freedoms of all Spaniards. 
D. RECOGNITION AFTER ISOLATION 
Franco, having been shunned after the Civil War and World War II, led Spain by 
rallying national sentiment and preaching self-sufficiency which initially overshadowed the 
isolation. Franco's declaration of"benevolent neutrality" in 1944 may have saved Spain from 
a Stalin supported Allied intervention that would have ended the Franco regime, but could 
have left Spain in the clutches of communism. Spanish membership in the UN was denied on 
the basis ofFranco's ties and initial support to the Axis powers, but Franco knew his country 
would be recognized and rewarded by the West for his continual, strong anti-Bolshevik 
stance. 19 
Spain was in dire straits when loans brought currency flowing into the country in the 
late 1940s, and, at the same time, the United States revised its Spanish policies, appropriated 
aid, and, in 1951, resumed full diplomatic relations. Franco felt that Spain's important 
geographic location would only help to further integrate Spain into the international 
organizations that would help the Spanish people but, and possibly more important, it would 
legitimate the regime to the world. The most important of the international agreements both 
17 Amodia, franco's Political Legacy, 245. 
18 Ibid., 245. 
19 Arango, The Spanish Political System, 137. 
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came in 1953, the Concordat signed with the Vatican and the Pact of Madrid signed with the 
United States. 
The Concordat moved Spain toward Rome and away from religious separatism. 20 
Franco declared Catholicism as the nation's religion and retained control of the appointment 
of bishops and archbishops, but many critics saw it as an instrument in strengthening the 
regime's hold on Spain. In return, the Church received subsidies for running schools, received 
tax exemptions for property and contributors, and received the right to regulate marriages, 
annulments, and separations. 21 This agreement gave more to Church than to State, but the 
idea of Church support for the regime was noted around the world. 
More importantly was the Pact of Madrid, a three part agreement that would permit 
the stationing of U.S. troops in Spain "to strengthen the capabilities of the West for the 
maintenance of international peace and security. "22 The Pact ended Spanish neutrality and 
provided for mutual support (not mutual defense), construction of bases for U.S. use (the 
bases remain under Spanish sovereignty), and economic and military aid. The terms ofthe 
agreement were negotiable after ten years and provided Spain much needed fiscal support that 
amounted to approximately $1.5 billion in the first ten years ofthe Pact. 23 
As with the Concordat, critics ofthe Franco regime believed the Pact of Madrid kept 
the dictatorship alive at a point in time when it was the most unstable. But with these 
agreements signed, the economy was on the mend and, in 1955, the UN approved Spanish 
membership in that body-further integrating Spain into the West. The international isolation 
2
° Crow, Spain, 353. 
21 Arango, The Spanish Political System, 138-9. 
22 Cited in Arango, The Spanish Political System, 139, from New York Times, 
27 September 1953, p: 16. 
23 Solsten and Meditz, Spain, 52. 
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was over, but, as it played out, Spaniards would have to wait for Franco's death for true 
democratic transition in Spain. 
E. IMMINENT TRANSITION 
The years just before Franco's death, it seemed, would determine Spain's future. In 
the early 1970s, Franco, in his early eighties and in failing health, began losing his grasp on 
power through social unrest: student protests, worker strikes, Church liberals, regional 
extremists, and the very middle class workers that Franco's socioeconomic policies created. 2~ 
To respond to the restlessness, Franco knew that Spain would either have be become more 
liberalized or that the government had to repress the people and return to an era like that after 
the Civil War. His response to the dilemma was the appointment of Admiral Luis Carrero 
Blanco as Prime Minister in June 1973, a move that, to many, signalled a regression to the 
1940s or 1950s for many Spaniards. 
The new government was organized as if it was to be in place to succeed Fran co. The 
cabinets since the 1960s had become more liberal through the years, but that changed when 
Carrero filled the positions with men from the bunker (the name given to the hard-line 
Franquists). Carrero was determined to proceed with the authoritarianism that Franco had 
established, even if it meant stifling reforms and crushing the opposition. There would not 
be enough time for that, as Carrero would be assassinated in November 1973. A year later, 
a former government official told Le Monde "that Carrero's death had shortened the process 
of the post-Franco succession by at least five years."25 
Carlos Arias Navarro assumed the Prime Ministership in 1974 amid demonstrations, 
strikes, and runaway inflation. Arias' policies and appointments tended to be Franquist, but 
24 Arango, Spain: From Repression to Renewal (Boulder: Westview, 1985), 93. 
25 Le Monde (3 December 1974) in Paul Preston, The Triumph of Democracy in Spain 
(London and New York: Methuen, 1986), 49. 
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he did accept the need for liberal individuals to assist in dealing with the problems in the 
country. Arias walked on a fine line between the liberals and the bunker as he tried to deal 
with the problems of reform and liberalization versus the status quo, labor militancy, student 
discontent, and ever increasing terrorism. The Arias government, serving before and after 
Franco's death from February 1974 to July 1976, never achieved any real success because it 
was pulled between the different end goals of those wanting to continue with Franquism and 




FROM AUTHORITARIANISM TO DEl\10CRACY 
The democratic transition in Spain officially began once Prince Juan Carlos de Borb6n 
was crowned King two days after the death of General Franco on 20 November 1975. 
Included in the transition phase would be the creation of the democratic regime, free 
elections, a constitution, and a peaceful power shift to an alternate party without military 
intervention or bloodshed. 1 This reform process would come as a surprise because it was 
believed that Franco had molded the King, the army, and the key institutions (the Council of 
the Realm, the Cortes, the National Council ofthe Movement) to continue his legacy. 2 In 
reality, the legacy began to die as early as 1973 when Prime Minister Carrero Blanco was 
assassinated by the Basque terrorist organization, ETA (Euzkadi ta Azkatasuna or Basque 
Nation and Liberty). 
The first surprise became apparent in the King's coronation message in which he 
pronounced the legitimization of the new monarchy through the formation of a constitutional, 
democratic, and parliamentary monarchy.3 Since Franco had supervised the upbringing of 
Prince Juan Carlos, the King's profound dedication to democracy was unexpected and part 
of the reason for the successful, peaceful transition. 4 In addition, he announced a royal 
1 The definition of transition is that found in Linz and Stepan, "Democratic Transition and 
Consolidation in Southern Europe," 1-6. In addition, I include the power shift to an alternate 
party, not seen by Linz and Stepan as a prerequisite before moving on to consolidation; see 
Gillespie, "The Continuing Debate on Democratisation in Spain," Parliamentary Affairs 46, no. 4 
(October 1993): 539-40. 
2 Raymond Carr and Juan Pablo Fusi Aizpurua, Spain: Dictatorship to Democracy 
(London: Harper Collins: 1981), 205. 
3 Ibid., 208. 
4 Andrea Bonime-Blanc, Spain's Transition to Democracy: The Politics of Constitution-
making (Boulder: Westview, 1987), 21. 
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pardon for many political prisoners and appointed a cabinet to guide the Spanish reform 
process before the end of 1975. Juan Carlos made it clear that he had no intention of carrying 
on the old regime by setting out to do away with the institutions he inherited and, in his role 
as commander-in-chief, by maintaining control of the army. Both areas were extremely 
important parts of the transition process that had to be achieved if a successful transition in 
Spain was to be realized. 
Political elites, those actively involved in the transformation of the government and 
parties, worked with the King for political transition. Unhappy with the lack of political 
freedom under Franco, these political elites played an important role in formulating and 
carrying out the political reforms that led to political institutions, political parties, elections, 
and the constitution. The united political elites, although of varying political beliefs, banded 
together, putting aside their differences, to set forth a viable system for the political 
reformation needed in Spain. s 
A ruptura (clean break) was needed from the old Franquist regime. The policy of 
continuismo (continuation) set by the government of Prime Minister Arias after Franco's 
death did not provide significant change to please the reformists in the first months after the 
death ofFranco. The project Arias presented in 1976 to the Cortes did not provide for the 
rapid transformation that the reformists, those in and out of government seeking ruptura, had 
expected nor did it appease the growing hostility felt among Spaniards for political 
representation. A combination of this loud public dissent and the King's desire for rapid 
change, compelled him to ask for the resignation of Arias and move forward seeking a quicker 
transition. 
In July 1976, Prime Minister Arias, who was appointed by Franco, resigned as 
pressure from all political entities mounted, allowing the King to select the first Prime 
s The elite settlement model argues that successful democratic consolidation in Spain was 
primarily the product of a profound transformation of Spain's political elites from disunity into 
consensual unity. See Gunther, "Spain: The Very Model of the Modem Elite Settlement," 38-80. 
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Minister of the post-Franco era.6 Juan Carlos chose the Prime Minister from the three names 
sent to him by the Council of the Realm as required by the Fundamental Laws. He chose the 
least known, Adolfo Suarez Gonzalez, a man who had risen to prominence on the coat tails 
of the Minister Secretary-General of the Movimiento, Fernando Herrero Tejedor. Suarez 
quickly opened a dialogue with the center and left representatives1 moved toward national 
elections, integrated parties into the political system, introduced pact-making to the parties, 
and postponed economic and social policy decisions until after political democratization had 
been stabilized. 
From this brief background, the major issues and relationships of Spain's transition will 
be developed. The important role of the political elites and the King, while appeasing the 
military and the opposition, whether for ruptura or continuismo of the Franquist legacy, will 
become quite apparent as the democratization in Spain began to take hold in 1976. 
A. POLITICAL CHANGE 
Prime Minister Arias' slow reform at the end of 1975 and the beginning of 1976 was 
the subject of much opposition. Besides King Juan Carlos, Minister of the Interior Manual 
Fraga Iribarne (leader of the conservative Alianza Popular) and Foreign Minister Jose Maria 
Areilza pushed strongly for rapid, liberal reforms and the workers showed their displeasure 
for the Arias government through strikes (from January to March 1976, there were 17,731 
strikes and throughout 1976 some 156 million man hours were lost to strikes compared to 
only 3,156 strikes in 1975, the year ofthe most strikes under Francof The demise of the 
Arias government became more apparent when the King pronounced in April 1976 through 
a Newsweek interview that the reform process was a disaster and that the remnants of 
6 Crow, Spain, 402. 
7 Jose Maria Maravall, The Transition to Democracy in Spain (London: Croom Helm, 
Ltd., 1982), 12-13. 
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Franquism had no place in Spain. 8 The King received much support throughout this period 
from reformist ministers in the cabinet and from Adolfo Suarez. Suarez had become friends 
with the King when he was Director-General of Spanish Television (RTVE) from 1969 to 
1975 and then Vice-Secretary-General of the Movimiento in 1975 9 After Arias announced 
his resignation in July 1976, Suarez was appointed Prime Minister, part of the new, younger 
breed at only 43 years of age, and he stated, "I feel myself and I believe I am a democrat." 10 
Suarez worked initially with his reformist cabinet and the King to put reform on track, 
events that provided credibility to the Suarez government and "confidence among the 
opposition forces that significant reform was possible." 11 Presented to the Cortes only two 
months into his term., Suarez cleverly disguised his democratic political reform package as the 
Eighth Fundamental Law, subtitled the Ley para Ia Rejorma Politica (Law for Political 
Reform). 12 With political tact and skill, Suarez and King Juan Carlos persuaded the Cortes 
to, in effect, disestablish the Franquist procedure for selectingprocuradores (members) and 
institute a bicameral body based on universal suffrage. The lower house (Congress of 
Deputies) would be elected, but the King would retain the Franquist policy of appointing one-
fifth of the otherwise elected Senate (upper house) and nominating the Prime Minister 
(President ofthe Government). 13 
Other than minimal lobbying of the Alianza Popular (AP) to secure passage of the 
Law for Political Reform, Suarez' formal contacts with the opposition began once the Law 
8 
"Juan Carlos Looks Ahead," Newsweek (26 April 1976): 49. 
9 Paul Preston, The Triumph of Democracy in Spain, (London: Methuen, 1986), 71. 
10 Arango, The Spanish Political System, 252. 
11 Gunther, "Spain: The Very Model of the Modern Elite Settlement," 49. 
12 Bonime-Blanc, Spain's Transition to Democracy, 24. 
13 Ibid., 25. 
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was ratified by referendum on 15 December 1976 with 94.2 percent of the vote. 14 A 
negotiating committee was formally organized to articulate the concerns of the opposition on 
matters of political parties, electoral laws, and elimination of the Movimiento and sindicatos. 15 
These negotiations with political elites of the opposition allowed Suarez to proceed with 
reforms that may have otherwise been blocked had the opposition not played a consultative 
role in formulating the policy. 
As promised, Suarez announced that the first democratic elections for the Cortes in 
41 years would be held on 15 June 1977. By the time of the elections, over 100 parties were 
legalized, to include the Spanish Communist Party. On election day only six parties showed 
promise of electoral success but, after polling had been completed, only two parties emerged 
with strong support. Suarez' popularity sent 166 members of the only recently formed Union 
Centro Democratico (UCD) to the 350-seat lower house and 106 members to the 248 seat 
upper house. The other electoral success was given to the Partido Socia/ista Obrero Espana/ 
(PSOE) with 118 seats in the Congress of Deputies and 48 seats in the Senate. 16 
These elections clarified the political development in Spain. The small parties either 
disappeared or merged into the larger ones. The new President of the Government would 
again be Adolfo Suarez and the next phase of democratic transition would begin with the 
drafting of the new Constitution. A seven-man ponencia (drafting committee) was 
appointed 17 to produce a constitutional text that would be acceptable to the broadly 
14 Maravall, The Transition to Democracy in Spain, 11 and 151. 
15 Opposition included representatives from the Socialists, Social Democrats, 
Communists, Liberals, Christian Democrats, the three largest trade unions, and the Basque, 
Gallego, and Catalan groups. See Gunther, "Spain: The Very Model ofthe Modern Elite 
Settlement," 50. 
16 Arango, The Spanish Political System, 261. 
17 The ponencia would be composed of three UCD members and one member of the 
PSOE, PCE, AP, and Catalan nationalists. See Bonime-Blanc, Spain's Transition to Democracy, 
37. 
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represented committee. This is another example of the usage of a few political elites to 
produce a consensus before the draft went to the full Congress ofDeputies, Senate and the 
nation. The Proyecto Constitucional (Constitutional Project) went forward in many phases 
before it was finally approved by the government, the population through a national 
referendum, and the King on 27 December 1978. 
Another important result of consultations with political elites after the June elections 
was the meetings that produced real political advances between Suarez and his opposition on 
the left, Santiago Carrillo Solares of the Partido Comunista de Espaiia (PCE) and Felipe 
Gonzalez Marquez of the PSOE. From these meetings came the Pactos de Ia Moncloa (Pacts 
of Moncloa) in which compromises were made by these political elites in areas such as 
economic recovery, union reform, increased public investment, and tax reform. The PCE and 
PSOE exerted pressure on their unions, the Comisiones Obreros (CC.OO.) and the Union 
General de Trabajadores (UGT), respectively, to keep workers from striking which would 
further hinder the struggling economy. 18 The Pacts achieved some of their economic goals 
by aligning the balance of payment deficit, reducing inflation to 16 percent, increasing exports 
by 29 percent, and implementing fiscal reforms but, for all of the efforts of workers, they 
realized a benefit from lower inflation and tax reform but unemployment continued to grow, 
reaching 8 percent in 1978. The short-term measures helped, but Spain's economy needed 
desperate attention. 
With the Pacts of Moncloa in place and the King's approval of the Constitution, 
Suarez, to take advantage of these positive developments, called for the second general 
election to take place in March 1979. The UCD, a broad coalition that often had 
incompatible aspirations within its membership, was not expected to do well because of the 
internal "erosion of confidence in Suarez ... "19 within the party. Much to the surprise of 
18 Maravall, The Transition to Democracy in Spain, 42. 
19 Carr and Fusi, Spain, 24 7 
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those pollsters and journalists, the UCD maintained its political status in Madrid, actually 
gaining two seats for a total of 167, but lost a good portion of its influence in the provinces, 
specifically the Basque and Catalan regions municipal elections in 1980. As Suarez 
announced his new government, the opposition complained that the UCD was too centrist and 
not continuing the reform process as Suarez had promised in 1976?0 
Prime Minister Suarez was determined to resolve the political problem of regional 
autonomy, which would decentralize power to the provinces. Statutes were achieved for the 
Basque and Catalan regions but these agreements did not appear to resolve the problems for 
the UCD, Suarez, or the provinces. Basque terrorists continued to strike innocent Spaniards, 
recession and unemployment plagued the economy, and Suarez closed himself off from the 
political elites he had so successfully dealt with just a few years before. The tactful negotiator 
had lost his appeal and his party was beginning to fall apart. It nearly fell in May 1980 with 
a vote of censure in which the PSOE and its leader, Felipe Gonzalez, became a credible 
alternative to the UCD and Suarez. 21 
Suarez, although distant from all except his closest advisors, continued his push for 
full regional autonomy. He believed that "the destiny of democracy in Spain was indissolubly 
linked to the autonomy of the regions. "22 Spain would become a federal state once all regions 
were satisfied, but it would not happen before Suarez resigned in January 1981. 
The King appointed Leopolda Calvo Sotelo, a conservative centrist of the UCD, to 
be the new Prime Minister. Before his confirmation, the Cortes was taken hostage by a group 
of Guardias Civiles (Civil Guards) attempting to overthrow the government in favor of an 
authoritarian monarchy. Due in part to the resolve of King Juan Carlos, the coup d'etat failed 
and the UCD rallied around the new Prime Minister. Unfortunately, the UCD's disintegration 
20 Solsten and Meditz, Spain, 60-61. 
21 Carr and Fusi, Spain, 253-54. 
22 Ibid., 255. 
31 
was unstoppable and the PSOE had their second chance-a second chance that gave the 
PSOE a sweeping victory in the 1982 elections. The final transition step appeared to be 
complete, a peaceful transfer of power from one party to another. 23 
Before moving into the consolidation process led by Felipe Gonzalez, some of the 
most important issues of the transition will be further developed. Initially, the political aspects 
ofparties, elections, and the constitution will be looked at; and those areas will be followed 
by economics, social attitudes, the church, the military, and the King. 
1. Party Development 
The development of the party system was a big step in the democratization process 
considering the only legal political entity in Spain for over 30 years was the Movimiento. 
Early in the transition, groups began open recruitment and formed or merged into political 
unions. The press had been liberalized and new papers like El Pais began printing articles, 
stories, and editorials to forge the unity of the nation's democratic forces. The Arias 
government was concerned about the rapid development of parties and its opposition was 
growing into strong organizations like the Coordinaci6n Democratica (Democratic 
Coordination), which was a merger of two other groups, the Plataforma de Convergencia 
Democratica (Socialists and Christian Democrats) and the Junta Democratica 
(Communists).24 
The Democratic Coordination was extremely critical of the new Suarez government 
and called for the complete ruptura from the policy of continuismo in a manifesto to the 
Spanish people. It called for all Spaniards to unite and bring about a leadership representing 
23 Solsten and Meditz, Spain, 62. 
24 David C. Jordon, Spain, the Monarchy and the Atlantic Community (Washington, 
D.C.: Corporate, 1979), 1-7. 
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the diversity of Spain. 25 Suarez answered this manifesto with his announcement of a reform 
plan, the disbanding ofthe National Movement, and the legalization of the Communist Party 
(PCE). These moves were definite breaks from the Franco past that the opposition was 
calling for. 
After the elimination of the Movimiento, Prime Minister Suarez brought together a 
centrist coalition as he moved Spain toward the 1977 elections. The coalition was mainly 
composed of the Partido Popular and the Centro Democratico, which eventually became the 
UCD. This coalition was a mix of small, middle-class reformists parties that ranged from the 
center-right to the social democratic left. 26 Initially, the appeal ofthe UCD rested with the 
personality and displayed competence of Adolfo Suarez; but after the 1977 elections, the 
cabinet ministers, members of the Cortes, other government officials, and party organizers of 
the UCD banded together to ensure that democratic reform and the party stayed on track. 
Once the parties had taken their seats in the Cortes after the 1977 elections, it was the 
job of Prime Minister Suarez and King Juan Carlos to move the reforms forward. The 
success of the two parties, the UCD and PSOE, led to the consolidation of smaller parties to 
attempt to create their individual power bases within the Cortes, while the stronger parties' 
leaders were brought in to consult with the government on important policy issues. The 
elections helped to strengthen the party system and to stabilize the government and the reform 
process. 27 
25 Juan Antonio Ortega Diaz-Ambrona, "The Transition to Democracy in Spain," in 
Christopher Abel and Nissa Torrents, eds., Spain: Conditional Democracy (London: Croom 
Helm, 1984), 24-25. 
26 Constantine C. Menges, "Spain: The Struggle for Democracy Today," The Washington 
Papers 6, no. 58 (Beverly Hills and London: Sage, 1978): 66. 
27 Gunther, "Spain: The Very Model of the Modern Elite Settlement," 51. 
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2. Labor and Unions 
Six unions emerged to represent labor after being legalized in 1 977. Of those, only 
two had enough membership to have significant influence within government circles: the 
Socialist UGT and the Communist CC.OO. Both claimed over 1.5 million members just three 
months after legalization, but the CC. 00. had a head start due to their infiltration of the 
government unions during the Fran co era. 28 
The full advantages of unionization were not realized in Spain because of their deep 
ties to political parties. The implication being that union leaders were tied to and members 
of the political parties, thus respecting the party leaders and adopting stances of cooperation 
and consensus to nurture the transition process. As mentioned earlier, the PSOE and PCE 
used their power to influence the UGT and CC. 00. to implement the Pacts of Moncloa (page 
30). Throughout the transition process, the union bureaucracy and party dependence limited 
the participation ofthe rank-and-file membership. 29 As a result, the labor movement in Spain 
between 1977 and 1982 was demobilized, union membership of eligible workers dropped 
from 50 percent to 10 percent, and the predominance of the CC.OO. diminished as the 
popularity of the PSOE and UGT grew.30 This resulted in slower economic and social reform 
in trade for political stability and may have also prevented military intervention had radical 
measures been taken to achieve significant reform in all three areas at the same time. 
The Workers' Statute adopted in 1980 provided union rights as guaranteed by the 
Constitution. It also eliminated government involvement in labor issues, provided for a 
minimum wage, and guaranteed access to social security. Work councils were formed to 
28 See Menges, "Spain," 21-22 or Maravall, The Transition to Democracy in Spain, 165. 
29 Salvador Aguilar, Alfons Bartel6, Bernat Muniesa, Albert Regia, and Jose Maria Vidal 
Villa, "Notes on the Economy and Popular Movements in the Transition," in Abel and Nissa, eds., 
Spain, 131-32. 
30 Ibid., 128-32. 
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speak for employees and the UGT negotiated a pact in 1980 with the Spanish Confederation 
of Employers' Organizations which set a social contract for employer and union actions. 
These advances covered some 800,000 companies and 6 million workers at a time when union 
membership was rapidly decreasing. 31 
3. Electoral System and Elections 
Each house of the Cortes uses a different system for electing its members as directed 
by the Law for Political Reform and the Electoral Law. The lower house is based on the 
d'Hondt system of proportional representation and the upper house is a direct majority 
system. The Electoral Law of 1977 guarantees universal, free, and direct suffrage and 
requires voting by secret ballot. Elections are held every four years unless the Cortes is 
dissolved, in this case elections are called to elect new members to the parliamentary body. 32 
For the Congress of Deputies, a voter votes a party and each party must obtain three 
percent of the vote to receive a seat. Each province has a two seat minimum, plus one 
additional seat for every 144,500 inhabitants. In the Senate, each province is represented by 
four seats elected from a multiparty list in which each voter selects three candidates. 
The 1977 elections were considered quite successful because there was a relative 
balance between left and right (right-center). However, in the Congress of Deputies, the 
d'Hondt system caused over-representation of the traditional, rural, conservative, and less-
populated provinces at the expense of the left. 33 Another success resulted from the fact that 
the leading party had a viable opposition party which tended to lend stability to the political 
31 Solsten and Meditz, Spain, 153-56. 
32 Ibid., 212. 
33 Maravall, The Transition to Democracy in Spain, 23. 
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system. With both parties being relatively moderate politically, the polarization that had 
plagued the Spanish Second Republic and other countries had ended in Spain. 34 
Table I (on page 37) shows that election results during the transition period, in 1977 
and 1979, were quite similar and displayed stability in the new democracy. In 1979, the major 
parties (UCD, PSOE, and PCE) picked up additional seats as did the previously 
unrepresented regional parties (PSA, HB, and EE) at the expense of the old AP (CD or 
Coa/ici6n Democratica) and the previously represented regional parties (CiU and PNV) 35 
Change was more significant at the regional and municipal levels rather than at the national 
level. Regional parties achieved great success in their respective provincial elections after the 
1979 national elections, a trend that continued to the end of UCD leadership in 1982. Most 
of the change was actually brought on by the UCD through its overly conservative social and 
economic policies and the problem of autonomous regions. These difficulties caused political 
crisis and turned the electorate away from the UCD as the 1982 elections approached. 
4. Constitution Making 
As previously stated, the constitution was drafted by a seven-man ponencia. The 
representatives were sent by their parties to prepare a constitution that would be acceptable 
to all in an atmosphere of cooperation and compromise. This process of drafting an 
acceptable constitution for the major political forces was chosen in hope that the failures of 
34 Maravall, The Transition to Democracy in Spain, 23-24. · 
35 Ibid., 45-50. Abbreviations not previously used represent: PSA is Partido Socialista 
de Andalucia or Andlucian Socialist Party; HB is Herri Batasuna or Party of the Basque 
Homeland; EE is Euskadiko Eskerra or Basque Left; CiU is Convergencia i Uni6 or Catalan 
national party; and PNV is Partido Nacionalista Vasco or Basque Nationalist Party. 
36 
Percentage of Vote Number of Seats 
Party 1977 1979 1977 1979 
UCD 34.8 35.5 165 167 
PSOE 29.4 30.8 118 121 
PCE 9.3 10.9 20 . 23 
AP-CD 8.4 5.8 16 9 
CiU 3.7 2.7 11 9 
PNV 1.7 1.6 8 7 
PSA - 1.9 - 5 
HB - 1 - 3 
EE - 0.5 - 1 
Others 12.7 9.3 12 5 
Table 1: Spanish Congress of Deputies Election Results, 1977 and 1979 
past Spanish constitutions would not be repeated.36 Progress was made between the ponentes 
and in five months the draft was finished. After vigorous debate and input from interest 
groups, the ponencia reconvened to incorporate the concerns of the nation. 
After consensus on the new version of the draft, it was sent to the Constitutional 
Committee of the Congress ofDeputies. Debate on individual articles slowed the process to 
a snail's pace and led the UCD to meet with the PSOE at a Madrid restaurant to resolve their 
differences. These political elites of the leading parties agreed to compromises in all the major 
problem areas and the floor debates in the Congress of Deputies quickly proceeded without 
36 For a discussion of former constitutions, see Jose Pedro Perez-Llorca, "Commentary," 
in Robert A. Goldwin and Art Kaufman, eds., Constitution Makers on Constitution Making: The 
Experience of Eight Nations (Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute, 1988), 266-68. 
37 
further delays. 37 Similar private discussions took place in the Senate and, like in the lower 
house, the constitution moved through quickly after compromises were made. 
Once the legislators approved the text, it was presented to the people in a referendum 
in December 1978. Of the 67 percent of the electorate that went to the polls, nearly 88 
percent approved the constitution. The last phase of the process was when King Juan Carlos 
signed the Spanish Constitution of 1978 on 27 December 1978. 38 
The document proclaims Spain to be a social and democratic state, to be a 
parliamentary monarchy, and to have a bicameral legislature. It provides basic civil, political, 
and socioeconomic rights; to include the right to vote at age 18, the right to be protected by 
the rule of law, and the right to assemble. It also affirms the dissolubility of the nation but 
recognizes existing nationalities and allows for substantial regional autonomy. Senor Jose 
Pedro Perez-Llorca, one ofthe UCD ponentes, stated that "the writers of the Constitution of 
1978 found the formulas to break decisively the repetitious cycle that had so often placed in 
jeopardy the collective navigation of the Spanish ship of state along a free, peaceful, orderly, 
and democratic course. "39 
B. ECONOMIC CONTINUATION 
As the transition got underway, there were significant economic problems to go along 
with the chaos of political transformation. Set off by the 1973 oil crisis, the splendor of the 
"economic miracle" was gone. In 1977, the debt was over $14 billion, the unemployment rate 
37 Gunther, "Spain: The Very Model of the Modem Elite Settlement," 59-60. 
38 Bonime-Blanc, Spain's Transition to Democracy, 62-63. 
39 Perez-Llorca, "Commentary," 275. 
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was 6.3 percent, and inflation was over 26 percent~0 With double digit inflation and high 
unemployment well into the 1980s, the economy became stagnant 
Successive UCD governments did little to support the struggling economy or to 
reduce Spain's dependence on imported oil. The near total preoccupation with 
democratization left little time for developing effective economic policy. The UCD did 
attempt a stabilization policy to reduce wage costs, to eliminate unprofitable firms, to increase 
opportunities for labor management, and to stabilize international economic relations.~ 1 The 
Pacts of Moncloa had some positive results but uncorrected structural deficiencies that 
remained from the Franco era made Spain vulnerable to continued economic decline 
throughout the transition period. 
In spite of the economic decay, the role ofthe economic elites became important in 
helping the transition process. Business and their interest groups are typically a more 
conservative segment of the population; however, most of the Spanish business sectors 
endorsed the government's program to break with the Franco past. In the early years of the 
transition, the economic elite supported the UCD, but they were also supportive of Gonzalez 
and the PSOE, the CiU, and the PNV. Business supported the ruptura because they saw that 
the old authoritarian system had become exhausted and was retarding growth, which gave the 
government an elite sector to provide support instead of voicing disagreement that could have 
impeded democratization. 42 Although the rewards to the business sector came slowly, the 
new system did provide positive economic progress once consolidation began. 
40 Jordon, Spain, the Monarchy and the Atlantic Community, 34-35. 
41 Aguilar, et al., "Notes on the Economy and Popular Movements in the Transition," 127. 
42 For more on the economic elites support of transition, see Robert E. Martinez, "The 
Business Sector and Political Change in Spain: Apertura, Reforma, and Democratic 
Consolidation," in Richard Gunther, ed., Politics, Security, and Democracy: The Case of Spain 
(Boulder: Westview, 1993), 113-39. 
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C. SOCIAL ATTITUDES 
Changes in Spanish society can be related to the social movements wanting the 
freedoms afforded the citizens of other Western European countries. Inequality of conditions 
and of opportunity were the issues that bound movements and ushered in the changes after 
the death ofFranco. The move from the ultraconservative social policy of the Franco regime 
to the liberal social freedoms enjoyed during the transition can only be described as radical. 
The inequalities enforced through public laws, church regulations, and press and 
media controls had been put in place to preserve the traditional role of the family and to 
maintain formal relationships between the sexes-inequalities that left Spaniards 
unknowledgeable about the way others lived. Tourism was one of the main factors 
responsible for changing the way Spaniards viewed their society when they learned from 
tourists how the rest of Europe lived. Not only did tourists bring hard currency, but they 
brought their democratic social values to Spain.43 This social awareness brought from the 
Europeans began in the 1960s and was an important driving force for social change before 
and transition phase. 
Another major influence of social change was the return of Spanish workers to Spain 
from Europe because of the oil crisis in the 1970s. About one in ten Spaniards lived abroad 
in 197044 and the return of these individuals, estimated at about 750,000 in the decade of the 
1970s45 , brought back capital for investing and a familiarity with life in Europe. After 
investing in or buying businesses, along with their desire for the way of life they had grown 
43 From in 1960 to 1975, foreign tourism rose from 4 to 32 million annually, see Crow, 
Spain, 376-78. 
44 Michael Kenny, "Rural Life in Spain: Continuity and Change," in William T. Salisbury 
and James D. Theberge, eds., Spain in the 1970s (New York: Praeger, 1976), 61. 
45 Solsten and Meditz, Spain, 1 07. 
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accustomed to in Europe, these individuals became important leaders in the sociocultural 
transformation of post-Franco Spain. 
Sexual freedoms also changed significantly during the transition. The sale of 
contraceptives was legalized in 1978, but little was done to educate the population for safe 
and correct usage of the different forms of contraception. With the loosening of sexual 
practices and the limited knowledge about the use of contraception which replaced the old 
policy of restraint, a great demand for abortion to rid unwanted pregnancies was created. 
Because this issue was extremely controversial in this country that was predominantly Roman 
Catholic, abortions would remain illegal and medically unsafe throughout the transition 
period. 
Marriages, once regulated by the Catholic Church, and the size of families have also 
changed. The marriage rate is down from seven per 1,000 that had held steady for about 100 
years to five per 1, 000 in 1982, while the size of families shrunk from 3. 8 to 3. 5 persons 
between 1970 and 1981.46 This is most likely related to the change of the role of women in 
society. No longer do they need their husband's permission, permiso marital, to work, own 
property, or travel as in the Franco days. Traditionally, women were honored in the role of 
wife and mother, but this has changed significantly as women have entered the job market, 
are marrying at an older age, and are starting their families later. The principal barrier to 
women has not been social biases but unemployment. As the transition closed in the early 
1980s, women were nearing equal enrollment with men at Spanish universities. 
Income distribution was still a problem during the transition. Unemployment and 
urbanization led to problems in the cities and low wage labor shortages occurred in rural 
areas. However, urban dwellers that held jobs saw their salaries increase with continued 
structural modernization of the economy that resulted in a growing middle class. In smaller 
towns of the north and south, there were very different circumstances. Income distribtJtion 
46 Solsten and Meditz, Spain, 110. 
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in the north was quite even but in the south, where land distribution was unequal, incomes 
varied significantly and often led to conflict. n 
Another important aspect to changes in Spanish society revolved around the Catholic 
Church. Early in the transition, it became obvious that the role of the Church in a democratic 
Spain would be quite different from that in Franco's Spain. 
D. THE CHURCH 
The Roman Catholic Church began to distance itselffrom the Franco regime in the 
late 1960s and more so after Cardinal Taranc6n became the Archbishop of Madrid and 
President of the Episcopal Conference, the body that spoke collectively for the church. A 
liberal man and friend of Pope Paul VI, Taranc6n was very critical of the regime and the 
hierarchy of the Church followed their leader's example. They opened the churches and 
monasteries as protected sanctuaries where the various opposition groups could meet; thereby 
the church helped to develop diverse sectors of the democratic opposition into a unified 
movement against the Franco regime. 48 In 1973, the publication put out by the Episcopal 
Conference, The Church and the Political Community, demanded revision of the 1953 
Concordat and the independence of Church and State. 49 
Throughout Spain's history, the pendulum swung too far left and right when it came 
to Church and State. The Second Republic declared that Spain did not have an official 
religion and Franco followed by giving official recognition to the Catholic Church. The 
drafters of the 1978 Constitution, to appease to all parties, left some ambiguity in Article 16. 
47 Solsten and Meditz, Spain, 105-6. 
48 Jose Casanova, Public Religions in the Modern World (Chicago: The University of 
Chicago Press, 1994), 87. 
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Freedoms of religion and worship are guaranteed, there shall be no State Religion, but 
appropriate cooperation shall be maintained with the Catholic Church and the other 
confessions. 50 
The Church was quick to point out that its prophetic role, based on Vatican Council 
documents, had not changed and it would continue "to preach the faith with true freedom, to 
teach its social doctrine and to discharge its duty among men without hindrance. "51 But, 
individual bishops expressed their personal political beliefs to their own dioceses and others 
declared that the only parties that Catholics should vote for were those of the political center. 
The Church was also critical of the Constitution because of reservations about articles 
concerning education and marriage but, again, some individuals were more vocal-Monsignor 
Gonzalez Martin "called it an agnostic document that omitted any reference to God and that 
failed to recognize the rights of the true religion. "52 
The Church continued to be vocal on issues that were vital to their ability to provide 
its pastoral role under the beliefs of Rome and Roman Catholicism. Issues it continued to 
deal with through the transition were education, marriage and divorce, contraception and 
abortion, and the role of Catholicism in Spanish society. This role was important, but the 
Church did not have the influence that it had during the Franco regime. 
The slow condemnation of the attempted coup in 1981 caused many to question the 
dedication of the Church to democratic reform. The hierarchy was committed but was having 
trouble adjusting to its new role. After many years of being the only legal place of worship, 
the Church became less influential as society became more liberal and open. A 1980 survey 
50 Bonime-Blanc, Spain's Transition t~ Democracy, 102-3. 
51 Audrey Brassloff, "The Church and Post-Franco Society," in Abel and Torrents, eds., 
Spain, 63. 
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confirmed that Mass attending Catholics were fewer in number but still strong in commitment 
to the routine observances oftheir religion, like baptism and marriage53 
E. AN ACQUIESCENT MILITARY 
General Franco made his desires clear in his last public message, read posthumously, 
that he expected the military to support the man he had chosen to be his successor: 
Out of the love that I feel for our country, I beg you to continue in peace and 
unity and to extend the same affection, loyalty and continued show of strength 
and support that you have given me to the future King of Spain, Don Juan 
Carlos de Borb6n. 54 
This, and the fact that Prince Juan Carlos was a military man that had graduated from the 
military academies and understood the views of the officer corps, helped him to win their 
support and confidence. However, their support was not total as the status quo that provided 
the military its power was being reformed. 
Many senior military hard-liners were skeptical of the government's reformist agenda 
and determined that the unrest, public disorder, and strikes were indicators of the need for a 
stronger, less liberal government. Violent clashes continued and rather than tightening 
security, the King made his unhappiness of the Arias government known and asked for the 
Prime Minister's resignation. 
With Prime Minister Suarez came change. To keep the military leadership behind his 
reforms, he met with them and listened to their concerns. This helped to ease their fears that 
reforms were moving with uncontrollable speed and that the Prime Minister would consult 
them before major policy announcements or changes. Suarez and the King worked together 
53 Solsten and Meditz, Spain, 113. 
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to retire the old hard-liners and fill their positions with younger, reform-minded commanders 
like General Gutierrez Mellado, who became the Vice President for Defense. 
The r~al test came when Suarez legalized the PCE. It was seen as a betrayal of the 
cause for which the Civil War had been fought and of his word that he had given in one of 
their meeting that the PCE would not be legalized. In addition, Suarez chose to make the 
announcement as the Easter holiday began-a time when most of the senior officers would 
be away from their posts. The King and General Gutierrez Mellado played a significant role 
in briefing the reformist senior officers for this announcement, and, these briefings paid off 
since the only reactions were the resignation of the Minister of the Navy and the public 
statement of dissatisfaction by army leaders. 55 
Terrorists of ETA targeted senior military officers throughout the transition period. 
In 1978 a coup d'etat was planned in response to the strategic promoting of reformist officers 
by Suarez and Gutierrez Mellado and their undermining the power of the hard-liners that 
remained. The plan was compromised, the organizers were lightly punished, and it acted as 
a planning rehearsal for the 23-F (the name given to the attempted coup on 23 February 1981) 
coup attempt. 
The 23-F coup resulted in the abduction of the entire Cortes and holding all the 
democratically elected political elites hostage to create a political vacuum and the imposition 
of military rule. Juan Carlos ordered the conspirators to desist and other military officers to 
support him and the Constitution. 56 A televised statement by the King reassured the Spanish 
people that democracy was the future of Spain and more than three million Madrileiios 
demonstrated in favor of their democracy on 27 February. 
After these embarrassments, the military realized that democracy was going to survive 
and they needed to adjust to it. Many factors reinforced this realization: 1) hard-liners had 
ss Carr and Fusi, Spain, 226. 
56 For a discussion ofthe coup and the military after 1975, see Paul Preston, "Fear of 
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failed to overthrow the government; 2) demoralization by the failures and the unbecoming 
behavior of those prosecuted for the planning of the coups; 3) hard-liners suffered from 
internal disunity; and 4) the King's role convinced the military that the monarchy would never 
legitimate a military overthrow. Besides these, the fact that the people demonstrated in the 
streets of Madrid led by Fraga (AP), Carrillo (PCE), Gonzalez (PSOE), and UCD leadership 
proved that Spain was united, even across party lines, in the support of democracy. 57 
F. THE KING'S ROLE 
The role ofKing Juan Carlos cannot be understated. At the beginning, the legitimacy 
of the King was on questionable legal grounds because of the manner in which he assumed 
the throne, but his actions quickly showed his determination to lead Spain from dictatorship 
to democracy and quieted many critics. His leadership, popularity, and charisma assisted in 
facilitating the reformist political change that he wanted for his country. Juan Carlos was 
involved behind the scenes conducting discussions with the political and military elites in 
order to secure key political appointments like that of Adolfo Suarez as Prime Minister and 
to achieve successful transition policy like the Law ofPolitical Reform. In addition, he was 
responsible for initiating the removal of Franco's appointed Prime Minister, Carlos Arias 
Navarro, and for contacting the exiled leader of the PCE, Santiago Carrillo. 
The 1977 elections contributed to the King's continued popularity because they were 
the fulfillment of the reforms that had been initiated upon his coronation. The legalization of 
the PCE, an important step toward the elections, required the King to use all his tact and skill 
to diffuse potential problems within the military because its leaders vehemently opposed the 
Communists. Gutierrez Mellado's appointment as Vice President for Defense allowed for 
57 Felipe Agi.iero, "The Assertion of Civilian Supremacy in Post-Authoritarian Contexts: 
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someone inside the military hierarchy to carry out the King's plan for the replacement of 
ultraconservative commanders with more liberal, reform-minded leaders. 
Because of his actions since the death of Franco, the ponente agreed that the 
monarchy would become mandated within the Constitution and continued in Spain rather than 
a Third Republic. Juan Carlos, once dubbed "Juan the Brief' by PCE leader Carrillo in the 
days following Franco's death, received overwhelming support during the drafting of the 
Constitution from the PCE and most of the other parties. 58 And, the ultimate seal of approval 
for the King was the referendum on the new Constitution, in which the great majority 
expressed their willingness to accept the parliamentary monarchy. 59 
As found here, the reincorporation of the monarchy provided democracy with a 
stronger base of popular support and presented it with the means to repel attacks from anti-
democratic groups, such as the hard-line Franquist military officers. The King played both 
sides to just the right level to ensure cooperation among these various segments of society. 
The key to his leadership was deciding which method or methods to use that most effectively 
accomplished the task ofjuggling conflicting interests and opinions. With the success of the 
transition, King Juan Carlos' leadership obviously balanced the contradictory forces that could 
have derailed democracy in Spain. 
G. VAWABLESOFCHANGE 
Much of what has just been described could have easily occurred differently and 
prevented this transition process. The steps taken were done with a goal in mind, the 
achieved goal, but there was no specific transition model for Spain's leaders to follow that 
58 Joel Podolny, "The Role of Juan Carlos I in the Consolidation of the Parliamentary 
Monarchy," in Gunther, ed., Politics, Security, and Democracy, 101-3. 
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would guarantee a successful transition from dictatorship to democracy. For this reason, 
some of the possible variables that could have effected the transition will be discussed. 
The most important preparation for democracy in Spain began well before Franco's 
death. The intention was not to liberalize the Spanish economy, society, and education 
system to the point that it reached in the mid-1970s, but Franco's reforms within the economic 
and educational sectors did create incalculable progress within a society that had been largely 
isolated and autarkic from the end of the Civil War to the late 1950s. These reforms and the 
death of Admiral Carrero, the man Franco had chosen to be the leader of the King's cabinet 
after his death, allowed for significant change across the spectrum just before and in the years 
after the death of the Caudillo. 
The economic reforms that were born out of the 1959 Stabilization Plan helped to 
build an economic infrastructure and provided for the development of the economic or 
business elites. These structures and individuals were strong enough to achieve the economic 
miracle that catapulted Spain to the rank of 11 on the list of industrialized nations in 198060 
and to maintain a level of economic stability during the transition, a time when the 
government was focused on political reform. The ability to concentrate on the transformation 
to democracy with a functional capitalistic economy, although it was protective and regulated, 
was a luxury that greatly enhanced the successful transition. 
King Juan Carlos was perhaps one of the most important post-Franco variables. His 
early declaration supporting the process of democratization was paramount and ensured that 
he felt it his responsibility to move forward, to include the replacement of Arias and holding 
national elections. The King's inside dealings with the President of the Cortes and Council 
of the Realm, Torcuato Femandez-Miranda, his former tutor and collaborator, to have the 
name of Adolfo Suarez on the list of Prime Ministerial candidates was successful; otherwise, 
the King would have had to select from what would have undoubtedly been a list of t.hree 
60 Kenneth Maxwell and Steven Spiegel, The New Spain: From Isolation to Influence 
(New York: Council on Foreign Affairs Press, 1994), 7. 
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hard-liners or break with the legal, Franquist procedure for selecting a Prime Minister. Either 
of the latter options could have postponed or completely derailed the democratization 
process. 
Another important relationship that factored into the transition success was that 
between the King and the military. Had the King not had an intimate knowledge of the 
military and its leaders, it is extremely likely that a successful coup d'etat would have occurred 
before 1981. The good relationship was furthered by the King speaking with and listening 
to the leadership and junior officers and the appointment of General Gutierrez, a reformist, 
to lead the army. Once Gutierrez was in place, the old hard-line officers were retired or 
removed from their command positions and replaced by younger, more conciliatory officers. 
In short, the military was left out of the agenda-setting and its own disunity averted the 
chances ofhard-liners to counter the transition agenda.61 After Franco's death in 1975, King 
Juan Carlos commanded the military, and the Constitution of 1978 further guaranteed the 
King's role as Head of State and Commander-in-Chief of the armed services. 62 
In addition to the non-intervention of the military, the Church also removed itself from 
the political transition. The Church was a political actor before and after the Second 
Republic, but the 1965 Second Vatican Council (Vatican II) caused the Church to distance 
itself from the Franco regime, to call for political and economic freedoms, to provide support 
to and house meeting ofthe opposition movements, and to scrutinize and attack Franquism. 63 
After Franco, the Church became supportive of social concerns but did not voice a political 
preference or support for the parties or candidates in the election phase. The political elites 
did not let religion become a division to threaten the transition. 
61 Agiiero, "The Assertion of Civilian Supremacy in Post-Authoritarian Contexts,"' 359. 
62 Carr and Fusi, Spain, 236 and 244. 
63 Arango, Spain, 85-86. 
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A positive factor that helped to move the transition along was the overwhelming 
majority of Spaniards-from the whole political spectrum and in varying amounts-wanted 
change. "The underlying dynamic of the transition process was the interplay of reform from 
above by the government and pressure from below by the democratic opposition. "64 Both 
sides played off each other to keep the process moving and as it turns out, the UCD 
government under Suarez was willing to work with the opposition well before they were 
ready to accept him. 65 Striking workers forced action on the part of the government to 
respond with some measures to better economic conditi·ons, while at the same time the 
government needed to limit wage increases and constrain inflation. The result was the Pacts 
of Moncloa negotiated by the parties and in turn received support from the party affiliated 
unions. Throughout the transition, the opposition played well against the government, and 
they responded with policy instead of with violence or repression. 
The most important variable of the transition was the elite settlement. For centuries, 
Spanish politics swung radically from one extreme to the other with continuous change and 
instability. The history was so conflictual that Spaniards perceived their country as "two 
Spains," the genuine Spain and the anti-Spain, present to destroy the other to save the 
nation.66 The lack of progress ofthe second Arias government led many, including the King, 
to believe ruptura was the best move to unite the political elites and proceed toward a more 
rapid transition. So, at a time when parties were organizing, elections has not yet been 
scheduled, and constitution making was still only an idea, Adolfo Suarez and Juan Carlos 
64 Carr, "Introduction: The Spanish Transition to Democracy in Historical Perspective," 
in Robert P. Clark and Michael H. Haltzel, eds., Spain in the 1980s (Cambridge, Mass.: 
Ballinger, 1987), 3. 
6s Felipe Gonzalez, then leader of the PSOE, said that the first dozen or so attempts made 
by Suarez to meet V[ith the PSOE were declined, see Gunther, "Spain: The Very Model of the 
Modem Elite Settlement," 49. 
66 Cited in Ibid., 44, from Linz, "Tradition and Modernity in Spain," (Unpublished 
manuscript, 1972), 2. 
50 
were actively talking with the leaders of the intluential sectors of society, mostly political 
elites, to achieve political reform, electoral reform, a basis for free national elections, the 
Constitution, and other watershed events that have resulted in today's democracy in Spain. 
Perfect examples are the Law for Political Reform and the 1978 Constitution. The old 
Franquist Cortes was persuaded by Suarez, the King, and Fermindez-Miranda "to commit 
institutional suicide"67 when they passed the Law for Political Reform which in essence 
required that their Cortes seats be filled by elected representatives. In regards to the 
Constitution, to clear up the final sticking points, eight representatives made famous the 
restaurant Jose Luis because it was the location where they met to resolve the problems that 
remained between the UCD and PSOE. Without the successful use of the elite negotiated 
consensus, it is quite likely that the post-Franco transition would have ended similarly to the 
Second Republic. 
Richard Gunther ends his chapter, "Spain: The Very Model of the Modern Elite 
Settlement," by saying that the one final variable to the Spanish transition was luck. 68 The 
reason being that events would have occurred differently if ultraconservative Carrero had not 
been assassinated; ifKing Juan Carlos had not appointed Fernandez-Miranda to the posts of 
President of the Cortes and Council of the Realm; if Suarez had not replaced Arias; if the 
PSOE had not been led by the moderate Gonzil.lez; if Fraga had not led the AP; if Carrillo had 
not led his party from Stalinism to Eurocommunism; and if it had been Juan Carlos who had 
been accidently shot and killed by his brother, instead of the other way around. Many factors 
led to the successful transition, but the changes continued as the Socialists took power in 
1982 and consolidated the Spanish democracy. 
67 Gunther, Giacomo Sani, and Goldie Shabad, Spain After Franco: The Making of a 
Competitive Party System (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1986), 3 5. 
68 Gunther, "Spain: The Very Model of the Modem Elite Settlement," 78. 
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V. THE SOCIALIST CONSOLIDATION 
The rise to power of the PSOE provided the stimulus that moved Spain from 
transition into consolidation. Democratic consolidation entails having met certain criteria that 
allows the government to function without threats of outside intervention or overthrow. The 
process may take a generation to remove the obstacles that can threaten a fragile democracy 
in its infancy. The UCD government did a good job in moving Spain through the transition 
phase; however, the government of Felipe Gonzalez further strengthened the successes of the 
transition through modified policy in the 1980s that ensured legitimacy in Spain's democratic 
future. 
Spain's democratic consolidation has been the topic of many distinguished scholars, 
and Table II (on page 54) provides the three distinct dimensions required, as seen by Juan J. 
Linz and Alfred Stepan, for consolidation. 1 The structural dimension was supported by the 
free elections, constitution, and peaceful transition of power to the opposition in 1982. 
Backing for the attitudinal dimension was provided through election and referenda turnout 
percentages and positive public opinion polls.2 The behavioral dimension was the least secure 
1 Many discussions of consolidation are in print, a few are: Enrique A. Baloyra, 
"Conclusion: Toward a Framework for the Study of Democratic Consolidation," in Baloyra, ed., 
Comparing New Democracies: Transition and Consolidation in Mediterranean Europe and the 
Southern Cone (Boulder: Westview, 1987), 297-302; Jose Maria Maravall and Julian Santamaria, 
"Political Change in Spain," in Guillermo O'Donnell, Philippe C. Schmitter, and Laurence 
Whitehead, eds., Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Southern Europe (Baltimore: Johns 
Hopkins University Press, 1986), 89-93; Linz and Stepan, "Democratic Transition and 
Consolidation in Southern Europe," 1-69. Table II data from Linz and Stepan, 3. 
2 In all cases, 1976 and 1978 referenda and 1977, 1979, and 1982 elections, turnout was 
in excess of two of three eligible voters; see Arango, Spain, 163 and 173. Many opinion polls 
showed similar results, for example, between 1978 and 1983 from 69 to 85 percent believed 
democracy was the best political system for Spain; see Linz and Stepan, "Political Crafting of 
Democratic Consolidation or Destruction: European and South American Comparisons," in 
Robert Pastor, ed., Democracy in the Americas: Stopping the Pendulum (New York: Holmes 
and Meier, 1989), 44. 
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in 1982 because of continued regional differences and economic difficulties. The goal of the 
PSOE in 1982 was to ensure that all of these dimensions were secure and strengthened 
through effective policy implementation in various key areas. This chapter will look at these 
key areas of change and as Paul Preston says in The Triumph of Democracy in Spain of the 
elections that brought the Socialists to power: "The transition is over. Real change could 
now begin. "3 
The Three Dimensions of Democratic Consolidation 
1. STRUCTURAL: No significant reserve domains of power should exist that precludes 
important public policies from being determined by the laws, procedures, and institutions 
that have been sanctioned by the new democratic process. 
2. ATTITUDINAL: A strong majority of the public opinion acknowledges that the 
regime's democratic procedures and institutions are appropriate and legitimate. 
3. BEHAVIORAL: No significant national, social, economic, political, or institutional 
actor spends significant resources attempting to achieve its objectives by challenging the 
institutions or rules of the regime with appeals for a military coup or revolutionary 
activities, and when the pro-democratic forces abide by its rules and do not engage in 
"semi-loyal" politics. 
Table II: The Three Dimensions of Democratic Consolidation 
Felipe Gonzalez and his party had the first real political mandate since the death of 
General Franco. The PSOE received 48.4 percent of the vote or 202 seats in the Congress 
ofDeputies and 64.4 percent or 134 seats in the Senate, achieving the first absolute majority 
of seats by one party (the UCD's maximum was 167 ofthe 350 seats in 1979). In addition 
to the sweeping electoral victory, the transfer of power was conducted without intervention 
or bloodshed, resulting in the first Socialist government to hold office in Spain sine¥ the 
Second Republic. 
3 Paul Preston, The Triumph of Democracy in Spain (London: Methuen, 1986), 227. 
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The highly centralized government, a holdover from the Franco days, allowed the 
PSOE, with its majority, an opportunity to quickly capture power through the large 
bureaucracy and begin its program of reform. Gonzalez moved quickly to provide reform to 
the many areas that were in need of modernization. These tasks, to be described in following 
sections, were the issues that would fully secure and consolidate the successful transition of 
the UCD governments between 1976 and 1982-these tasks undertaken by the Socialist 
government under Felipe Gonzalez would mark the second phase of democratization in 
Spain. 4 
A. REVAMPING THE MILITARY 
On the heels of the failed 1981 coup and the foiled plot by a group of colonels to seize 
power on the eve of the 1982 elections, the Socialists made military reform one of the first 
objectives of their new government. 5 From the. military's perspective, with the absolute 
majority of the PSOE in the Cortes, further opposition to the process of democratization and 
eventual civilian control of the military was futil~"military contestation shifted from political 
to more strictly corporate concerns, and from resistance to accommodation. "6 Even with the 
assumed commitment from the military of no further challenges of the government's authority, 
Gonzalez knew he needed to find a civilian Minister of Defense that could carry out the 
difficult task of instituting civilian rule over the military. 
Nards Serra Serra had been Mayor ofBarcelona when the annual Armed Forces Day 
celebration ofMay 1981 was held in his city. Many military leaders feared violence from the 
4 Maxwell and Spiegel, The New Spain, 28-29. 
5 Donald Share, Dilemmas of Social Democracy: The Spanish Socialist Workers Party 
in the 1980s (New York: Greenwood, 1989), 85. 
6 Agiiero, "The Assertion of Civilian Supremacy in Post-Authoritarian Contexts," 307. 
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Catalan people but instead they were warmly received and saw a festive celebration without 
incident. Serra's image among the military leaders was quite good and his professional 
background in economics and administration made him the choice candidate for the ministerial 
post. The Socialists had three goals for Serra to implement: "first to bring Spanish defense 
structures in line with those of Western Europe, secondly to professionalize and streamline 
the armed forces, and third to make Spain more independent of foreign arms supplies by the 
encouragement of domestic suppliers. "7 
In October 1983, Gonzalez introduced a five-year plan, which became known as the 
Serra Reforms, to depoliticize the military, establish civilian control, reorient budget and 
employment provisions, professionalize and reduce its officer corps, modernize its equipment, 
and modify the traditional role of internal security toward a current mission of national 
defense. This plan, which became Organic Law 111984 on 5 January 1984, placed the armed 
forces under the control of the Prime Minister with operational directives being passed to the 
services via the Minister of Defense. The operational power, now in the hands of the Minister 
of Defense, was taken away from the Joint Chiefs of Staff, now a consultative or advisory 
body. The King's role as Commander-in-Chief remained unaltered. 8 
The Minister's role was modified in many ways since the birth of the Ministry of 
Defense in 1977. Besides his increased participation in the command of forces, he was now 
tasked with the fonnation and implementation of policy, joint strategic planning, direction of 
military administration, and monitoring military preparedness. 9 The empowerment of the 
7 Maxwell, "Spain--From Isolation to Influence," in Maxwell, ed., Spanish Foreign and 
Defense Policy (Boulder: Westview, 1991), 11. 
8 Discussions of military reform can be found, for example, in: Maxwell and Spiegel, The 
New Spain, 29-31; Arango, Spain, 29-31; Share, Dilemmas of Social Democracy, 85-88; · 
Maxwell, Spanish Foreign and Defense Policy; Agiiero, "The Assertion of Civilian Supremacy in 
Post-Authoritarian Contexts." 
9 Agiiero, "The Assertion of Civilian Supremacy in Post-Authoritarian Contexts," 320. 
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Minister was critical and through the restructuring of internal service council prerogatives, 
this was achieved without any violence. The military chiefs were surprised by the extent to 
which Organic Law 111984 provided oversight and power to the Minister, giving to him many 
of the decisions that had been previously decided by the chiefs. 10 There was no reaction 
because the professionally-oriented military now concentrated on the adaptation of the 
military establishment to democratic institutions and on its transformation into a modern, 
efficient force. 
In addition to the military being controlled by a civilian Minister, other goals were 
achieved by the Prime Minister Gonzalez and Defense Minister Serra. The armed forces, 
made up of an army, air force, and navy, were reduced from 285,00 in 1988 to 217,000 in 
1991, of which 158,000 were conscripts serving an average nine month tour of duty." The 
military justice system was reorganized and its jurisdiction was severely restricted, a definite 
change from the near unlimited authority that military tribunals possessed during the Franco 
regime. The forces have been modernized and the Spanish defense industry has ramped up 
domestic production and become involved in joint ventures with other NATO and WEU 
member countries' industry to lessen Spain's dependence on non-alliance countries for arms 
purchases. Spain's membership in NATO and WEU, to be discussed in a later section, have 
been important driving factors for updating the Spanish armed forces to the standards of their 
Western European neighbors and alliance partners. 
The success of the transfer of power, equipment modernization, officer 
professionalization, and modification of the role of the armed forces was a major achievement 
of the Socialist government. "The civilian leadership, with the advice of a selected group of 
top level officers, pushed the modernization and reform goals beyond their original reach and 
provided coherence by taking a global view which the individual services could not attain, and 
10 Agilero, "The Assertion of Civilian Supremacy in Post-Authoritarian Contexts," 321. 
11 Maxwell and Spiegel, the New Spain, 30-31. 
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by connecting modernization with the reforms necessary for the accommodation of the armed 
forces within the rules of the democratic regime. "12 What was one of the main threats to 
democratic consolidation in 1982 had been successfully resolved with tact and prudence, thus 
eliminating the probability of another coup attempt and contributing strength to the 
consolidated democracy in Spain. 
B. MODIFYING THE SOCIETY 
Reform was widespread under Felipe Gonzalez and support for most of the Socialist 
reform bills went forward unimpeded. Social reforms were broad, covering many distinct 
areas such as health care, education, judiciary, administration, and, perhaps the most 
controversial, abortion. All of these reforms had needed attention during the transition but 
because of the all out effort given to political and, to a lesser degree, economic problems, 
these areas were not dealt with. The pace of legislation was rapid and quite impressive. 
Health care concerns caused the campaigning Socialists to take a strong position and 
commit themselves to improving the system if elected in 1982. After taking office, health care 
budgets were reduced but efforts were made to reduce fraud in the system and to crack down 
on pluriempleo (multiple job holding) within the health care sector. Both efforts were 
pursued to remove the waste in the system and ensure that doctors administered and patients 
received the care for which the government was spending tax payers money. These moves 
created fierce resistance from physicians and caused the resignation of Francese Ravent6s, 
the director oflnsalud, Spain's largest health care provider. Programs have been streamlined, 
the cost of care and of medicines have been reduced, and there is more choice in selecting 
physicians. There is still a need for further cost cutting and education concerning the benefits 
of preventative medicine. 
12 Agilero, "The Assertion of Civilian Supremacy in Post-Authoritarian Contexts," 333. 
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Abortion was an issue that created controversy, to be expected in a country with an 
overwhelming Roman Catholic population. In 1983, a revision in the penal code included the 
decriminalization of abortion and the result was mass demonstrations-some for further 
liberalization and government funded abortions for the poor and some against legalization 
under any circumstances. In April 1985, the Supreme Court struck down portions of the 
decriminalization provision, requiring the legislature to take further action on the issue. A 
revised law was passed allowing abortions only if the life or health of the mother is in grave 
danger, if the fetus is deformed, or it the pregnancy came about as a result of rape. In 
addition, time limitations are in place and the procedure must be approved by two doctors 
besides the surgeon. Only about 20 percent of Spanish abortions fell into these categories. 
The PSOE had to back away from full legalization due to the lack of public support, thus over 
300,000 illegal abortions were performed annually throughout the 1980s and into the 1990s. 13 
Another issue that caused demonstrations was the reform of the education system. 
Gonzillez introduced legislation drawn up by Education Minister Maravall that would regulate 
the relationship between private schools and the state, standardize the curriculum for all 
schools receiving state funding, and form councils of administrators, teachers, and parents to 
oversee the administration of their schools. 14 The Right, mostly the AP, and the Church 
protested the legislation as anti-democratic and anti-Catholic, claiming that it would force 
private schools to close. Despite the opposition, the bill became law in December 1983 and 
marked the first step in education reform that moved on to the university system in the late 
1980s, creating more shock waves in a system that was brought out of the past and into the 
present. These reforms require that students complete secondary schools and university 
entrance is based on ability instead of wealth and status. 
13 For more on the abortion issue, see Solsten and Meditz, Spain, 1 08; Share, Dilemmas 
of Social Democracy, 88; Arango, Spain, 224; Crow, Spain, 413,417. 
14 Arango, Spain, 224-25. 
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The area of judicial reform is another that may not have been possible had the PSOE 
not had its majority in the Cortes. With heated protest from the Right and the sitting judges, 
the government pushed through its policy in 1984 that implemented habeas corpus, 
mandatory retirement of judges at 65 instead of72 years of age, appointments of judges from 
outside the cliquish, tightly regulated legal corps, and direct control of the judiciary by the 
legislature. A tremendous backlog of cases and inefficiency led to an increase of Justice 
Ministry budget in and after 1988 to rid the books of the backlog and move cases to court 
quicker. 15 
A large civil service slowed the wheels of government during the transition and 
another campaign promise of the PSOE was to correct the public administration system. The 
first move was a break from traditional work hours that proved that the PSOE, with its 
majority government, had the will and ability to change the very way that business was 
accomplished in Spain. The Gonzalez Administration put nearly half a million civil servants 
on a continuous workday from 8 a.m. to 3 p.m. Monday through Friday, and the third 
Saturday of each month. 16 This move was aimed at the rampant pluriempleo in the public 
sector and in 1985 a law was passed prohibiting multiple job holding within the public sector, 
freeing up some 2,000 jobs in the Madrid ministries alone. The results of these administrative 
changes throughout the government increased performance, reduced absenteeism, and sped 
up the wheels of bureaucracy. The bureaucracy, whether it is supporting the health care 
establishment or issuing drivers licenses, is to work for the citizens, not the state, and it takes 
time to change the mindset of a civilian bureaucracy that has been in place forever. 
Despite all the positive changes in the social areas, there is still room for improvement. 
Many of the societal changes that the PSOE did enact were done as a result of their holding 
a majority of seats in the Cortes. The conservative opposition fought liberalization and often 
15 Share, Dilemmas of Social Democracy, 89. 
16 Arango, Spain, 223. 
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achieved success in toning down reforms to a level that was acceptable to parties on both 
sides of the spectrum. Even at those levels, Spaniards were pleased with the new social 
reforms because of nearly no social freedom during Franco's years and little progressive 
change by the UCD governments while they focused on the necessary changes to the political 
climate between 1976 and 1982. 
C. STABILIZING THE ECONOMY 
Of all the problems it faced, the Socialist government knew that the economy that was 
in crisis needed urgent care. Throughout the transition, Spain was accustomed to rising 
prices and wages, declining productivity, balance of payments deficits, inflation, and worst 
of all, unemployment. The Socialists promised the creation of800,000 new jobs in a country 
that had 2.2 million unemployed. 17 Economic policy, such as the promise jobs, would have 
to be truly spectacular to resolve the problems in the economy that still had weak, outdated 
infrastructure. Two PSOE officials said that Suarez and the UCD assumed the task of 
political transition and now Gonzalez and the PSOE would carry out the economic transition, 
transforming autarky to the capitalistic market system. 18 
Economy Minister Miguel Boyer set Gonzalez' program in place that would be 
controversial in that some short-term risks to the program could increase unemployment, 
damage the industrial sector, increase dependence on foreign capital while preparing the 
economy for admission to the European Union (EU). 19 The program would curb inflation, 
17 Richard Gillespie, The Spanish Socialist Party: A History of Factionalism (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1989), 421. 
18 Cited in Share, Dilemmas of Social Democracy, 72-73, from Mariano Guinda! and 
Rodolfo Serrano, La Otra Transici6n: Nicokis Redondo y el Sindicalismo Espaiiol (Madrid: 
U ni6n Editorial, 1986), 128. 
19 Gillespie, The Spanish Socialist Party, 421. 
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limit wage increases, reduce state spending, eliminate state subsidized, inefficient industry, 
redirect resources toward healthy enterprises, and overhaul the state fiscal system. 20 
Unemployment did increase to 3 million in 1986, but inflation was cut to 8 percent, the 
economy grew at over 2 percent, and the balance of payments deficits were eliminated. Most 
of the successes in the first term of Socialist government can be attributed to the 
implementation ofthe firm policy and the fall in world oil prices. 
The government raised social security pensions in 1983 to encourage retirements and 
then the hiring of replacements for the retirees. Other social security benefits had to be 
capped in order to maintain the budget after there were more retirements than expected, 
creating complaints from workers, unions, and legislatures claiming that the government was 
hurting those with jobs in order to provide work to the unemployed. The unions also argued 
that they had been taken advantage of when they were not consulted about the social security 
reform plan. 
After the social security dilemma, the PSOE chose to go to the Suarez-style of pact-
making to keep the opposition aware of the government's plans. Accords were signed with 
the major unions, entrepreneurial organizations, and employers groups to help the government 
correct the economy. Even with these agreements, unemployment continued to plague the 
Spanish economy and was double the EU average in 1986. Once again, strikes became 
rampant throughout the country and the government and unions bitterly attacked each other 
because ofthe lack of progress in putting the economy in order. 
Finally, a light started to flicker at the end of the tunnel. Spain's GDP (Gross 
Domestic Product) grew at nearly 4.5 percent annually between 1986 and 1990, far ahead of 
the EU average of3 percent. Per capita income more than doubled to $13,500 during this 
period and inflation remained below 7 percent at the end of 1990. Foreign investment flowed 
into the country to total some $80 billion by 1991 and unemployment had fallen to 16 pen;ent. 
In addition, forecasts provide for $7. 5 billion per year in EU aid for Spain between 1992 and 
20 Share, Dilemmas of Social Democracy, 72. 
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1996 which will undoubtedly assist the struggling economy to further develop a more stable, 
functional infrastructure of economic institutions. 
Spanish economic goals, driven by their need to meet EU standards, made recovery 
very difficult. Maastricht Treaty criteria for entry into the European Monetary Union (EMU) 
are strict and with the recession effecting all of Europe it seems impossible for Spain to 
remain on track to meet EMU standards and also achieve short-term economic expansion and 
prosperity_2l Perhaps now that the economies in Europe are beginning to recover, Spain will 
be able to resolve the lingering problems of their economy that has been a burden since the 
mid-1970s. 
D. INTEGRATING INTERNATIONALLY 
With the transition complete, it was time for Spain to reemerge onto the international 
scene. After so many years of isolation or limited exposure beyond the frontiers of Spain, the 
nation and its people were ready to venture into new organization and institutions that they 
had been banned from during the Franco dictatorship and too busy to deal with amid 
transition. The people would have differing opinions of these new relationships and to what 
extent the new Spain should become involved in or dependent of these relationships. 
1. The United States and NATO 
Many Spaniards were anti-American because ofthe 1898 Spanish-American War, the 
relationship that formed in 1953 between the United States and the Franco dictatorship after 
the signing ofthe Pact ofMadrid, and, as a result of the Pact, the American troops that were 
to be stationed on Spanish soil. Further actions and comments, after the transition was .well 
21 Maxwell and Spiegel, The New Spain, 42-47 and 50-53. Maastricht Treaty criteria 
listed on pages 50-51. 
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underway questioned the U.S. commitment to Spain's democracy. The first of these 
unreassuring occurrences came from U.S. Secretary of State Alexander Haig's 
pronouncement of 23-F as an internal matter, secondly was the Reagan Administration's 
Central American policy, and third was President Reagan's statement in a speech that many 
Americans believed that the Abraham Lincoln Brigade, consisting of Americans that were 
fighting along side the defenders of the Republic, was on the wrong side of the Spanish Civil 
War. 22 These are examples of the type of issues that fueled the fire of anti-Americanism that 
had begun when fighting erupted centuries ago over territories in the New World and it 
appeared that these sentiments would not be soon or easily forgotten. 
Twentieth century Spanish-American military affairs began as an outcome of the Cold 
War's bipolar split of Europe in the years after World War II. The Pact of Madrid was 
beneficial to both counties in the years after 1953 and, after Franco's death, the United States 
welcomed the liberalization that King Juan Carlos announced and urged Spain to pursue full 
membership in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). With the country on its way 
toward democracy and earlier member opposition to Spanish induction because of its 
authoritarian government, the United States felt that Spain's entry would secure the southern 
flank of the Atlantic Alliance. Membership, however, was not a priority of the Suarez 
government, but it did become a goal of the Calvo government and legislation agreeing to 
Spain's membership was passed by the Cortes in 1982, as the UCD was disintegrating. The 
popular PSOE actively opposed such membership on the grounds "that NATO did not suit 
Spain's defensive needs, that it increased the risk of nuclear war, and that it encouraged a 
dangerous bipolarization of the world. "23 
The campaigning Socialist leader, Felipe Gonzalez, promised a referendum on NATO 
membership and soon after his and the PSOE's accession to power there were signs of 
22 Maxwell and Spiegel, The New Spain, 35. 
23 Share, Dilemmas of Social Democracy, 80. 
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division within the party concerning NATO. Below, Table III provides Prime Minister 
Gonzalez' ten-point "decalogue" presented to the Cortes in October 1984 defining the future 
of his government's defense and security goals. M The debate was lively and consensus within 
parties or even more difficult between parties was unlikely. However, this policy set forth the 
government's desire for Spain to remain a member ofNATO and charged the PSOE to design 
a strategy that would convince the population that membership was in Spain's best interest, 
not to mention that withdrawal from the Atlantic Alliance may have become an insuperable 
obstacle to entry into the European Union. 25 
Ten-Point Decalogue Defining Spanish Defense and Security Policy 
1. Continued Spanish membership in NATO. 
2. Remaining outside ofNATO's military structure. 
3. The progressive reduction in the presence of American forces on Spanish soil. 
4. The non-nuclearization of Spain. 
5. The possible consideration of adherence to the Treaty ofNuclear Non-Proliferation. 
6. Spanish participation in the Western European Union was considered desirable. 
7. The advancement of a definitive solution for the problem of Gibraltar. 
8. The strengthening of Spain's role in the European Disarmament Conference and in 
the Disarmament Committee of the United Nations. 
9. Continued development of a network of bilateral agreements for defense 
cooperation with other Western European nations. 
10. Work toward a dialogue between the political forces to elaborate a Joint Strategic 
Plan. 
Table III: Prime Minister Gonzalez' October 1984 Decalogue 
24 Antonio Marquina, "Spanish Foreign and Defense Policy Since Democratization," in 
Maxwell, ed., Spanish Foreign and Defense Policy, 40-41. 
25 European Union became the name of the 12 country organization that was before 1 
January 1994 known as the European Community. 
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Prime Minister Gonzalez saw the tie between NATO membership and EU admission 
as the rallying point that could achieve a successful referendum result. The PSOE used many 
techniques other than the EU linkage to appeal to the Spanish electorate. The referendum 
was written in a manner that required a "yes" or "no" answer to a complex series of proposals, 
which included non-participation in the NATO military command, remaining nuclear free, and 
reducing American troop presence. High ranking government and party officials spoke to 
large groups of Spaniards in an attempt to explain the importance of NATO and European 
integration, and Felipe Gonzalez is quoted as having said to one of his audiences that "to 
break our relations with the Atlantic Alliance would create trauma, with consequences I 
cannot foresee." 26 Table IV (on page 67) shows that the PSOE campaign and referendum 
wording worked since the referendum supported the government's position and would 
continue Spain's membership in NAT0. 27 
In the years since the referendum, Spain's relations with the U.S. and NATO have 
become good with the exception of the 1985 incident of denied overflight rights during the 
Libyan bombing mission. Spain's bases were of immense importance during the 1990-1991 
Gulf War and in recent years the Spanish and American governments have been working 
together on policy formulation concerning issues of importance to both countries effecting 
Latin America. The reform of the military has led to active and effective participation in 
NATO with modem equipment and a well-trained, professional force contributing specifically 
to the defense of Spanish territory; the defense of the eastern Atlantic and western 
Mediterranean; the control of the Straits of Gibraltar; the use of Spanish territory in support 
ofthe Alliance; and support ofUN peacekeeping operations. 28 
26 Cited in Share, Dilemmas of Social Democracy, 79, from Cambia 16 ( 17 February 
1986), 19. 
27 Ib"d > 1 ., 83-84. 
28 Bruce George and Mark Stenhouse, "Western Perspectives of Spain," in Maxwell, ed., 
Spanish Foreign and Defense Policy, 85-86. 
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Referendum 
The government considers it appropriate for the national interest that Spain stay in the 
Atlantic Alliance according to the following terms: 
1. Spain's participation in the Atlantic Alliance shall not include its incorporation into 
the military command. 
2. The installation, storage, or introduction of new nuclear arms in Spain will continue 
to be forbidden. 
3. There will be a progressive reduction of U.S. military presence in Spain. 










Table IV: NATO Referendum Wording and Results 
Relations among Spain, the U.S., and NATO remain cordial and continue to be 
strengthened through diplomatic, economic, and military channels; however, the basis of the 
relationship, the Agreement for Defense Cooperation, has become legitimized as a mutual 
security pact vice the old pay as you use agreements that had existed since 1953. The support 
that Prime Minister Gonz3.lez has given to further European union has moved the main focus 
of Spanish policy away from the U.S. and NATO and toward the EU and Western European 
Union (WEU). Although initially slow in accepting Spain, the EU has seen Spain's influence 
grow as its democracy has strengthened and its participation in the institutions of the 
international community have began. 
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2. European Union and WEU 
European integration was always a goal of the post-Franco governments but it came 
much slower than expected. King Juan Carlos made reference to Spain's desire to become 
part ofEurope in 1975 when he stated that "the idea of Europe would be incomplete without 
a reference to the presence of the Spaniards .... Europe should reckon with Spain, and we 
Spaniards are European!"29 The 1962 denial ofEU membership during the Franco regime was 
understood and respected by the Suarez government when Spain's application was 
resubmitted in 1977. The surprise came when the newly democratic Spain was not granted 
quick entry into the EU--official entry negotiations were delayed on many occasions and 
finally began in February 1979. Two of the main points of contention that held up entrance 
were the effects of Spanish agriculture and fishing on the other members and EU financing. 
Spain's accession, with its neighbor, Portugal, finally occurred on 1 January 1986 after nearly 
a decade of negotiations. 
Other than the transition to democracy, Spain's entry into the EU is one of the most 
important events since the death of General Franco. The move in the direction of Europe has 
had profound positive effects on Spain's democratic consolidation and its status within the 
international community. The isolation suffered for decades is gone and this has strengthened 
the institutions of government, the infrastructure of the economy, and the security of the 
nation. Prime Minister GonzaJ.ez is a leading supporter of greater integration into a federalist-
type, single European political, economic, and security entity. 
In the first five years of membership, Spain was the economic star of the EU. 
Between 1986 and 1990, Spain's GDP grew at five percent annually, well ahead ofthe EU 
average. GDP per capita grew from 60 percent to 90 percent EU average during the same 
period and it includes a modest estimate of a thriving black market economy which acco.unts 
29 Cited in Maxwell and Spiegel, The New Spain, 38, from Paul Preston and Dennis 
Smyth, Spain, the EEC, and NATO, Chatham House Paper no. 22 (London: Routledge, 1984 ). 
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for a good portion of Spain's economic activity. To make a comparison, Spain's economy 
with the black market figures is on par with or a bit larger than that of Canada (Spain's 
population is about 9 million more than Canada's 30 million), a member of the G7-and Spain 
would not mind if the elite club of the rich industrial countries became the G8. 30 
Spain also had an opportunity in 1992 to improve its image around the world and to 
show its EU partners it was a valuable asset to the organization. 1992 celebrated the SOOth 
anniversary of the discovery of the New World, the Olympics in Barcelona, and Expo '92 in 
Sevilla. Billions of dollars were invested to prepare for these events and the visitors brought 
billions more into Spain during the year. Spain demonstrated it was to be a contender on the 
international scene, but the worldwide recession began to tarnish the shining economy once 
the festivities of 1992 were gone. 
Further economic integration into the EU's monetary union is still set for 1997, but, 
with the condition of the European economies, it is doubtful that the members will be ready 
for the European Monetary Union (EMU) with only France and Luxembourg meeting all 
criteria. Prime Minster Gonzalez fears that the EU risks entering into a two-tiered 
organization with Spain being one of the countries in the lower tier. In an attempt to avoid 
this, the government has programs in place to meet the Maastricht Treaty's EMU criteria but 
it is unlikely that Spain can meet the strict guidelines of government budget deficit to 1 
percent ofGDP, current account deficit to 2.3 percent ofGDP, and inflation to 3 percent by 
1996.31 The only hope is that the European economic recoveries that are just beginning are 
able to create an atmosphere of prosperity in which the people can constrain spending to meet 
the EMU requirements. It will be very difficult to achieve. 
With recovery apparently underway, the EU will be able to move on to other areas 
of integration. The economic integration has slowed the other possible linkages that 
30 
"After the Fiesta," The Economist, 25 April1992, center pull-out survey, pp. 3-6. 
31 Maastricht Treaty EMU criteria and data can be found in Maxwell and Spiegel, The 
New Spain, 50-51 and 86-87. 
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Gonzalez has advocated since his first election win in 1982. The economic slowdown has 
hindered complete union (economically, politically, and militarily), but, even with these 
difficulties, Prime Minister Gonzalez' support for the EU has not wavered. 32 He must work 
more closely with the business and labor sectors to achieve the needed economic 
performance. 
The issue of a single European defense and security establishment under the auspices 
of the WEU is on an unknown timetable. The past experience of the WEU is one of an 
organization that could never get itself going and was revived in the mid-1980s after a thirty 
year dormancy. Its revitalization came out of the days of arms reduction talks between the 
United States and the Soviet Union in which the Europeans felt that they were not being 
adequately involved in the discussions or informed of any progress between the superpowers. 
The Reagan Administration's unveiling of the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) was not well 
received by the Europeans and they in tum revamped the WEU to provide them a collective 
voice on issues effecting Europe and NAT0. 33 
Spain participates fully in the WEU since its membership in 1988 and has been actively 
involved with WEU missions during the Gulf War and in the Adriatic. The WEU has 
strengthened the European pillar ofNATO, which can be explained by the 1992 defense 
policy guidelines that states Spanish security is no longer confined to the security of Spanish 
territory and that the WEU should act as Europe's representative body to NAT0. 34 Another 
way that the WEU has strengthened NATO is from the increased participation and 
cooperation of Spain and France, the two nations that are not a part of the NATO integrated 
military command structure, in European defense and security through the revitalization of 
32 
"Not Plain in Spain," The Economist, 12 June 1993, pp. 17-18. 
33 An in depth look at Spain's relationship with the WEU can be found in Michael Clarke, 
"Evaluating the New Western European Union: The Implications for Spain," in Maxwell, ed., 
Spanish Foreign and Defense Policy, 165-186. 
34 Maxwell and Spiegel, The New Spain, 82. 
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the WEU. The possibility of the \VEU acting as the European defense and security 
organization is likely, but it is certainly not going to happen in the near future. The EU has 
many other concerns to work through before it can look to developing a European military, 
in or outside ofNATO. 
The future policy moves of the European Union in regards to the Western European 
Union are difficult to predict because it will take many years of negotiations to achieve a 
consensus that will develop the WEU into a union of the member countries' militaries. It will 
take determination on the part of all of the member countries, which will grow to 16 on 1 
January 1995, to create a Europe that speaks with one voice. 
E. STRENGTHENING POLITICALLY 
The dominance ofthe PSOE since 1982 has provided stability throughout the political 
system and it has also caused Spain to become a two-party nation with the PSOE filling the 
center-left role and the Partido Popular (PP-Popular Party) filling the center-right position. 
In the last election held in June 1993, the PSOE lost its majority in the Cortes and has to work 
with others to pass its legislation, a parliamentary situation that the Socialists had not been 
required to do deal with before the 1993 elections. The advantage that the PSOE has had and 
remains is the popularity ofPrime Minister Felipe Gonzalez. He has generated a public image 
that appeals to a majority of Spaniards and because of this his electoral value is an asset that 
the PSOE caters to and promotes. Some believe that his leadership and charisma have been 
the glue that has held the PSOE together since the 1970s. 35 
With the twelfth year of power now complete, Gonzalez still has many difficulties in 
front ofhim and a strong opposition party, the PP, to contend with (the PSOE won 159 seats 
from 39 percent of the vote while the PP won 141 seats from 35 percent of the vote). T,here 
has been splintering within the PSOE that could damage the possibility of a fifth successive 
35 Share, Dilemmas of Social Democracy, 121-24. 
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PSOE government in the 1997 timeframe if the problems are not resolved. The economic 
problems could also strain Gonzalez' political stamina as he continues to make hard decisions 
that sometimes have resulted in further inflation and unemployment as Spain proceeds into 
further European integration. 36 Politics and politicians are receiving critical public opinion 
because of questionable practices that have been touted as scandalous corruption from a 
government that has become to comfortable with its power. This appearance must be 
corrected in order to avoid a situation similar to that which Italy suffered and created a 
population that resented its politicians and its political system. 37 
Regional autonomy was one ofthe factors that led to the downfall of the UCD in the 
early 1980s. The 1982 Organic Law for the Harmonization of the Autonomy Process 
(LOAP A) was designed to slow the decentralization of the government to the autonomous 
regions as authorized by the 1978 Constitution. Before taking power, the PSOE had 
supported LOAP A, but the fierce opposition from the regional parties-and eventual ruling 
of its unconstitutionality-proved too extreme to pursue any further. Gonzalez opted to work 
with the regions at a pace that would please the greatest majority of people, a policy that 
proved to be effective. There are different levels of autonomy in the 17 regions of Spain 
today and the decentralization process has actually helped to reinforce the cohesiveness of the 
Spanish state through the constant dealing between the federal government and the regional 
governments. The Spanish sociologist Victor Perez-Diaz says that "on balance, the regional 
pacts have reinforced the degree of national integration. "38 Although the powers have been 
moved from Madrid to the regional capitals, it seems like the process of decentralized 
36 Maxwell and Spiegel, The New Spain, 69. 
37 Ibid., 95. 
38 Victor M. Perez-Diaz, The Return of Civil Society: The Emergence of Democratic 
Spain (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1993), 211. 
72 
government like that of Western European countries and the United States can also work in 
Spain. 
Spanish foreign policy has also looked south toward the Maghreb, the region that it 
fears will create the next area of instability that will require an international response. Spain 
and Italy had proposed the development of a Conference on Security and Cooperation in the 
Mediterranean (CSCM), modeled after the CSCE, to discuss the problems ofthe region in 
a forum that could provide resolution to the issues creating regional instability. This 
recommendation came in late 1990 at a time when others were concerned with the recent 
demise of the Soviet Union and appears to have died a quiet death. A second proposal came 
at an equally bad time, as the civil war began in the former Yugoslavia. The "5 + 5" talks 
were proposed to establish a communications link between the North Mediterranean countries 
of Spain, Italy, Portugal, France, and Malta and the counties of the Arab Union (Morocco, 
Mauritania, Algeria, Libya, and Tunisia) to deal with the same problems that the CSCM 
would have encountered.39 Both of these proposal gained little support from the United 
States and other northern European states because of the perceived connections ofLibyan 
supported terrorism around the globe. The Gonzalez government is determined to continue 
working for better relations with the Maghreb countries as they see that region as the largest 
single threat to Spanish security and, more specifically, the security of Spain's two North 
African enclaves of Ceuta and Melilla. 
In a dozen years, the PSOE governments led by Felipe Gonzalez have taken Spain to 
a new level through programs and policies that have led to successes like the restructuring of 
the military, modernizing and improving social conditions, and most importantly establishing 
a strong democratic process. There are areas that still need work, but overall Spain has 
experienced a spectacularly successful and, more importantly, a peaceful transformation. This 
consolidation process has ensured that the democratic infrastructure put in place during the 
transition in all areas of public policy are such that the country, through its people, can 
39 Maxwell and Spiegel, The New Spain, 58. 
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guarantee their future by electing individuals to represent their concerns and desires within 
that infrastructure without fearing reprisal, revolution, or overthrow. 
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VI. REFLECTIONS: THE HUNGARIAN CONTEXT 
Hungary was in ruin in October 1944. Much had been destroyed during the Second 
World War and what was left was either confiscated by retreating Germans or seized by 
advancing Soviets. The Hungarian elites were destroyed by the Germans and Soviets leaving 
no political nor civil hierarchy after the German-influenced Hungarian Arrow Cross regime 
was forced from power. The economy was in shambles and the people were left to rebuild 
their country. 
The Soviets supported the provisional Hungarian government of General Bela Miklos, 
made up of Communists, Socialist Democrats, Agrarians, and Liberals, until post-war 
elections could be held in late 1945. Even with the influence of the Soviet Red Army, the 
Hungarian Communist Party did not win the November 1945 elections, as shown in Table V 
(on page 76). 1 The Smallholders Party was the indisputable winner of the election with a 
simple majority within the Hungarian parliament. Although the majority, the inexperienced 
Smallholders were easily influenced by the Communists and distributed power such that the 
Communists were able to promote their agenda and eventually destroy the Smallholders 
power base. 2 
Next, the Communists formed with the Social Democrats and the National Peasants 
into a coalition called the Hungarian Independence Front in opposition of the majority 
Smallholders. Once firmly aligned, the Front set out to destroy the Smallholders Party from 
within and used the 22 right-wing deputies that left the Smallholders to become the Freedom 
1 Marian Grzybowski, "The Transition to Competitive Pluralism in Hungary," in Sten 
Berglund and Jan Ake Dellenbrant, eds., The New Democracies in Eastern Europe: Party 
Systems and Political Cleavages (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994 ), 173. 
2 George Schopflin, Politics in Eastern Europe, 1945-1992 (Oxford: Blackwell, 1993 ), 
65-66. 
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Party as their target. The Communists organized demonstrations in Budapest calling attention 
to the split in the Smallholders Party and the need for new elections; but the Smallholders 
leadership responded with the expulsion of the right-wing deputies. 
Party Number of Seats Percentage of Votes 
Smallholders 245 60 
Communists 70 17 
Social Democrats 69 17 
National Peasants 23 6 
Citizens' Democrats 2 0 
Table V: Distribution of Seats in the Hungarian Parliament, 1945 
The call for new elections by the Front could not occur if the ruling Smallholders 
expected to maintain its majority in parliament. The Soviets were increasing their presence 
in daily Hungarian life, and the formation of the political police with their questionable means 
of achieving their goals caused the government to question the intent of the Soviet Union. 
Prime Minister Ferenc Nagy and President Zoltan Tildy wanted to put off any new elections 
until the Soviet Red Army had been withdrawn from Hungary, then the communists would 
be less likely to be supported by the Soviet Union. 
The Soviet Union and its leader, Josef Stalin, had "hesitated to include Hungary in the 
Soviet Empire"3 at the end of the war, but that position was modified as the Soviet 
occupation authorities began to interfere with Hungarian politics to put the Hungarian 
Communist Party in power. The poor economy and thousands ofHungarian POWs in the 
Soviet Union were bargaining chips that Stalin used to increase Soviet hegemony in Hungary. 
3 Joseph Held, "Hungary on a Fixed Course: An Outline of Hungarian History, 1945 to 
Present," in Joseph Held, ed., The Columbia History of Eastern Europe in the Twentieth Century 
(New York: Columbia University Press, 1992), 205. 
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As inflation climbed uncontrollably and the national treasury was emptied, the Soviet 
Union offered to delay the Hungarian's reparation payment schedule and provide much 
needed food for the Hungarian people. The proposal won support from parliament even 
though the Smallholders leadership warned the deputies of the threat ofbecoming a puppet 
of Stalin and the Soviet Union. Soon thereafter, the Secretary General of the Smallholders 
Party, Bela Kovacs, was arrested and imprisoned by the Soviet political police on false 
espionage and conspiracy charges in February 194 7, and, then in May 194 7, Stalin had the 
opportunity he needed to strike the final blow. While Prime Minister Nagy was in 
Switzerland on vacation, he was accused of associating with and supporting the imprisoned 
Kovacs. The Prime Minister did not return to the threat of imprisonment, even though he was 
innocent of any wrongdoing, and the Smallholders Party began to disintegrate. The 
Communist takeover of Hungary was near complete. 
A. THE HUNGARIAN COMMUNISTS 
The 194 7 elections, under the new electoral law that favored the Leftist bloc, 4 brought 
66 percent of the parliamentary seats to the Hungarian National Front, or a majority for the 
communist-led coalition. The Front parties, with threats of imprisonment or execution, were 
directed by Matyas Rakosi, the Communist Party leader, to agree to a merger of leftist parties 
into the Hungarian Workers' Party (HWP), thus creating a single Marxist-Leninist party. 5 The 
liberals were purged from the party, all opposition parties were banned, and an economic 
program of industrialization, nationalization, and collectivization began, and, in no time, 
Hungary was a satellite of the Soviet Union. The political police became the State Security 
4 Andrew A. Michta, The Government and Politics of Postcommunist Europe (Westport, 
Conn.: Praeger, 1994), 57. 
5 Grzybowski, "The Transition to Competitive Pluralism in Hungary," 175. 
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Office and, like the Soviet Secret Police, could be found watching every facet of Hungarian 
life. 
The R.akosi government was as brutal as that of Stalin in the purges of the late 1940s 
and early 1950s. The society, to include the churches, the schools, the 1949 Constitution, and 
the workplace had been socialized, or Stalinized. The people were disillusioned and living 
conditions were substandard except for those party elites that lived in luxury. Rakosi was a 
Hungarian clone of Stalin, and, at the time of his death, "the very nature and policies of the 
party [HWP] and its ideologies served nothing but Soviet imperialism. "6 
After a power struggle, Nikita Khrushchev succeeded Stalin and expressed his 
displeasure with the hard-line tactics of the Rakosi regime. Even within the HWP a clear 
divide was apparent and it was led by Prime Minister Irnre Nagy, who supported the 
termination of forced collectivization and development of a light, consumer -oriented industry. 
Khrushchev provided overt protection to the reformist sector of the HWP, while Rakosi was 
backed by his mentor, Soviet Party Secretary Georgi Malenkov, and the HWP hard-liners. 
In spite ofMoscow's support, R.akosi was able to expel Nagy from the HWP for his reformist, 
rightist policies. The Soviet Communist Party in February 1956, after Khrushchev's "Secret 
Speech" denounced Stalin, implemented its de-Stalinization policy that provided momentum 
to the Hungarian reformists. Rakosi responded to the demonstrating Hungarian peoples' 
demands for liberalization in his usual manner offeree and terror, causing Moscow to respond 
by forcing R.akosi from office. 
The new Secretary General, Emo Gero, was able to convince Nagy to come back to 
the party and the Prime Ministership, but Gero was unable to restore peace and order to the 
country. Nagy, with Janos Kadar, who replaced Gero as Secretary General, announced the 
reforms that the people wanted to hear: wage increases, tax reductions, greater religious and 
political tolerance, and amnesty for political prisoners. Nagy appeared to be in control a~ the 
Hungarian Army, under General Pal Maleter, had restored order to the country, causing the 
6 Held, "Hungary on a Fixed Course," 218. 
78 
initial Soviet military intervention to withdraw. 7 Upon Nagy's announcement of the 
Hungarian government's decision to withdraw from the Warsaw Pact, Kadar's limits had been 
surpassed and he disappeared. "It can only be surmised that Kadar ... was informed of the 
Soviet decision to intervene and ... decided to break ranks with Nagy and the revolution'' 8 
The second insertion of Soviet troops succeeded in achieving its mission of crushing the 1956 
Hungarian Revolution and, for his alignment with Moscow, Kadar formed the next Hungarian 
government. 
Kadar was seen as a traitor by the Hungarian people when he returned to assume the 
leadership of the country. With little chance of bettering his image, Kadar set out to rebuild 
the collapsed HWP and normalize Hungarian-Soviet relations. The HWP was revitalized and 
emerged as the Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party (HSWP), dominated by Kadar and his 
loyal followers. The party developed over the years into what could be called an ideologically 
centrist party somewhere between Stalinism and Nagy's right-wing revisionism. Kadar was 
also able to work out an acceptable "modus vivendi with the Soviet Union based on mutual 
respect and loyalty. "9 
The Kadar dictatorship would last until 1988, and his image would go from that of 
the Soviet stooge and traitor to that of the man that instituted a "liberalization" that became 
known as "Goulash Communism." Perhaps part ofthe reason he allowed some economic and 
social liberalization was a compromise to the people for having crushed their revolution; 
however, there was no softening when it came to the ideology or authority of the Kadar 
regime. 10 The policies that emerged during Kadar's 32 year reign became known as Kadarism, 
7 Robert Weiner, Change in Eastern Europe (Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 1994), 46-47. 
8 Cited in Grzybowski, "The Transition to Competitive Pluralism in Hungary," 179, from 
Charles Gati, Hungary and the Soviet Bloc (Durham, N. C.: Duke University Press, 1986), 150. 
9 Ibid., 180. 
1° Ferenc Feher, "The Language of Resistance: 'Critical Marxism' versus 'Marxism-
Leninism' in Hungary," in Raymond Taras, ed., The Road to Disillusion: From 
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a soft communist dictatorship, making Hungary the most liberal country of the Eastern 
European communist regimes. 11 
B. REFORM AND BREAKDOWN 
The early 1960s brought continued collectivization as Kadar was attempting to 
remove the prospects of class division within Hungary. As this was achieved, the masses 
were becoming discontent with their lifestyles, so Kadar began reconciliation moves, such as 
amnesty for political prisoners and looser travel restrictions, to convince Hungarians that 
change would come, but only from the above. To promote his reconciliation plan, Kadar 
turned Rakosi's phrase, "He who is not with us is against us," into, "The one who is not 
against us is with us. "12 What Kadar was promoting was a plan that would have the masses 
accept the authority and rule of the party in return for the promise of a consumer socialism 
that would bring a better quality of life. 
The first real program that was adopted for all the country was the New Economic 
Mechanism (NEM) in 1968. The plan was a shift from the Marxist-Leninist system of 
planning as the responsibility was moved from central administrators to managers and the 
emphasis changed from that of quantity and heavy industry to quality and light industry. 13 
Initial response to the program was positive with increased wages and less government 
involvement within the economy, but as economic stagnation appeared in the early 1970s 
throughout the Soviet bloc and the 1973 oil crisis caused worldwide recession, the 
Critical Marxism to Postcommunism in Eastern Europe (Armonk, N.Y.: Sharpe, 1992), 50. 
11 Michta, The Government and Politics of Postcommunist Europe, 58. 
12 Mihaly Simai, "Hungarian Problems," Government and Opposition 27, no. 1 (Winter 
1992): 53. 
13 Michta, The Government and Politics of Postcommunist Europe, 58. 
80 
government had to intervene with subsidization in order to avoid starvation and civil unrest. 
In order to continue subsidizing the struggling economy, the Hungarian government had to 
borrow from the West, to the sum of some $9 billion by 1980, making Hungary, on a per 
capita comparison, the most indebted East European country. 14 
Realizing that conflict and social tension would be unavoidable in even a socialist-
styled economic atmosphere, the HSWP opted to provide other non-economic reforms to 
appease the citizens. 15 Although it did not affect the Hungarian one-party system, the 1968 
Electoral law offered an electoral process in which voters could choose among alternative 
party candidates for local office. They also instituted policies that gave more leeway to trade 
unions, more freedom to the press, and more influence to the Parliament; but, everyone 
understood that these changes were limited and as easily as the party provided, the party 
could take away. 
After the impact of the second round of oil price hikes in 1979, the government 
introduced a second NEM. The main components were decentralization of the decision-
making process and reduction of state subsidies. One success was that agrarian policy 
reduced the problem of shortages through importation offoodstuffs and farmers were pleased 
as their salaries increased from higher food prices. This period did not provide the industrial 
working class with much to be pleased about. With an inflation rate of 100 percent and 
modest wage increases between 1975 and 1985, the industrial working people of Hungary 
were forced into the second economy of overtime, a second job, or a family business on the 
side in order to make ends meet. The urban working class was very dissatisfied with the fact 
that the rural class had a better standard of living, resulting from higher food prices and 
imports. 
14 Michta, The Government and Politics of Postcommunist Europe, 58. 
15 Grzybowski, "The Transition to Competitive Pluralism in Hungary," 181-82. 
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Again, the crux ofNEM II dealt with economic liberalization that was designed to 
encourage free markets and prosperity at a time when many Western and Soviet banks feared 
that Hungary would follow the Polish and Romanian governments in defaulting on their loans~ 
but, the new austerity plan was sufficient reason for the IMF to offer membership to Hungary, 
thereby opening up lines of international credit to Budapest. 16 In the following years, the 
government did not enforce NEM II, the economy slumped further and unemployment was 
rising in a society that expected full employment. The real problem was the fact that 
increased governmental borrowing only allowed for the upkeep on debt interest payments. 
The loans were not helping build much needed economic infrastructure, instead it was 
bankrupting the country. Overall, the NEMs were failed initiatives and the population, 
including the elites and intelligentsia, had lost faith in the ability of the party to govern; 
however, within the population, no substantive dissident movement developed until party 
formation began when the downfall of the Kadar regime was imminent in 1987. 
Party elites realized that significant change was the only alternative to mass unrest and 
political upheaval. The reformists within the party called for a change of leadership and the 
opposition had been distributing underground newspapers, or samizdat, to display the 
unhappiness and tension that Hungarians felt for their government. The party had to figure 
out how to change so that it would not lose its control over society and party elites would not 
lose their privileges. The socialist formula was based on liberalization within the social 
structure, but political allegiance to the party's ideological guidance was to be 
respected-now, the party had to effectively handle the emergence of new, unofficial political 
organizations without alienating those individuals that still supported the party's socialist plan. 
By 1988, the HSWP could no longer contain the internal opposition movement, 
although in some cases it did try to repress it. With the external forces of perestroika and 
glasnost being touted by the Soviet leader, Mikhail Gorbachev, the party removed Kada~ and 
some of his closest supporters from leading the party and country and named the Prime 
16 Weiner, Change in Eastern Europe, 49. 
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Minister since 1987 to the job of party head, Karoly Grosz. This move was in essence a 
bloodless purge of the old guard in favor of a younger, less hard-line leadership. Considered 
a moderate when it came to reform, Grosz would have his hands full dealing with the new 
Prime Minister, the dynamic, market-oriented former party Economic Secretary, Miklos 
Nemeth. The satellite organization of the HSWP, the Patriotic Peoples Front (PPF), was 
transformed into an umbrella organization of the reviving society, the patriotic clubs, and 
professional groups by it Secretary General, Imre Pozsgay, the leading party reformist since 
the early 1980s. 17 At the same time, well-formed political parties began to emerge from the 
underground and threaten the very existence of the HSWP. 
Political control became increasingly difficult for the HSWP as party members and the 
opposition were aligning into like groups; hard-liner communists, conservative reform-mined 
communists, anti-system democrats, and radical, young technocrats whose ideology was not 
Marxism-Leninism but efficiency and rationality. As the communists were being outmatched 
in political debate, it seemed that for many there may have been a "disbelief in, and crisis of, 
communist ideology even among those who at least superficially were its adherents in the 
past. "18 At this point, the party opted for a break with its past to attempt to preserve as much 
power as it could by following the desired course of the democratic opposition. 19 The HSWP 
realized by October 1989 that it must undergo radical change if it was to survive politically, 
17 Andras Korosenyi, "The Decay of Communist Rule in Hungary," in Andras Bozoki, 
Korosenyi, and Schopflin, eds., Post-Communist Transition: Emerging Pluralism in Hungary 
(London: Pinter, 1992), 3. 
18 Simai, "Hungarian Problems," 54. 
19 Cited in Weiner, Change in Eastern Europe, 89, from Boz6ki, "Hungary's Road to 
Systematic Change: The Opposition Roundtable," East European Politics and Societies 7, no. 2 
(Spring 1993): 267-308. 
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resulting in its dissolution and the ability for the parliament to transform Hungary into a 
democratic republic after the elections that were scheduled for March and April of 199020 
C. HUNGARY AFTER COMMUNISM 
The first large, threatening opposition movement was that of the Hungarian 
Democratic Forum (HDF), which emerged in September 1987. With a moderate democratic 
agenda, the HDF enjoyed support from the reformist wing of the HSWP and took up the 
issues of press censorship, the oppression of Hungarian minorities abroad, the lack of free 
elections and a multi-party democratic system, and the privileges of the communist elite. By 
November 1988, the HDF had over 10,000 members and was joined by the anti-system 
Alliance ofFree Democrats (AFD), a center-left opposition movement that appealed to the 
urban, middle-class Hungarians. 
As developments continued, the HDF grew to 25,000 members and the AFD to 
20,000. Another party, the Federation of Young Democrats (FIDESZ-the Hungarian 
acronym), had emerged representing the young, anti-system opposition. In addition, in 
October 1989, the communists had split into two parties; Pozsgay and the reformers left 
Grosz and his hard-line followers of the HSWP to form the Hungarian Socialist Party (HSP). 
The traditional pre-communist era parties also reemerged: the Smallholders Party, the 
Christian Democratic Party, and the National Peasants Party. 
March 1989led to the start ofthe Opposition Roundtable, a negotiating group of the 
opposition and the HSWP to set forth the policy for the transformation process. The HSWP 
did not want to negotiate because it knew that the opposition's strength would force change 
to which the party would not want to agree. The negotiations, once the parties decided what 
was on the table, lasted from June to September 1989 and resolved many political. and 
economic issues preparing Hungary for a peaceful and democratic transition. 
20 Schopflin, Politics in Eastern Europe, 237. 
84 
The Constitution and Electoral Law were born from the Opposition Roundtable 
negotiations. The Constitution defined Hungary as an "independent, democratic state based 
in law, where the values of bourgeois democracy as well as of democratic socialism have an 
equal standing. "21 This compromise in which both a middle-class society and socialist element 
remained was the only way to reach a consensus. Agreements were more easily decided in 
regard to having a European-type, unicameral parliamentary system and providing a bill of 
rights and duties, which outlines the fundamental rights and responsibilities of Hungarian 
citizens. The 386 seat parliament is filled through a complicated, 4 percent threshold voting 
system of single member constituencies, regional party lists, and national party lists designed 
to limit the number of political parties in the country and in the parliament. 
Hungarians were quite busy at the end of 1989, but as 1990 was rung in there existed 
a power vacuum in anticipation of the March elections. Many of the 700,000 members of the 
old HSWP had not yet realigned with the resulting two communist parties or any of the 
opposition parties. In addition, the Opposition Roundtable had left the issue of the election 
of the president, the ceremonial head of state and commander in chief of the armed forces, 
undecided. The AFD, gaining membership and power in the months before the elections, 
forced a referendum when no consensus could be reached between the communists, wanting 
the presidential elections before parliamentary ones hoping that their well-known reformist, 
Pozsgay, would win; and the opposition, wanting the president chosen by the elected 
members of parliament. 22 The referendum postponed the presidential election, giving the 
victory to the opposition. 
The opposition parties were responsible for forcing the changes to occur as they did 
in Hungary from mid-1988 to the elections in 1990. Questions have been raised as to how 
one describes the events that occurred, was it a soft revolution or forced reform of the 
21 Boz6ki, "Political Transition and Constitutional Change," in Boz6ki, et a!., eds., Post-
Communist Transition, 65. 
22 Korosenyi, "The Decay of Communist Rule in Hungary," 9. 
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system? Andrew .1\rato, a professor at the New School for Social Research, says that 
Hungarians describe the political changes with the Hungarian term of rendszerwiltas, 23 or 
'exchange of systems', while Timothy Garton Ash has coined the notion of "refolution, "24 a 
mix of reform and revolution, to describe the negotiated settlement between the regime and 
opposition that led to the free elections and the transformation of the Hungarian way of life. 
1. Democratic Ideals Move Forward 
The first parliamentary elections in 4 7 years were completed on 8 April 1990. The 
results, as seen in Table VI (on page 87),25 brought six parties to parliament creating a 
governing coalition made up of the HDF, Smallholders, and Christian Democrats. The 
opposition consisted of the Free Democrats, the Young Democrats, and the HSP. The new 
HSWP made up of old hard-line communists failed to send a representative to parliament. 
The issue ofthe election of the president would arise again once the parliament went 
into session in May 1990. The HSP led the drive for a referendum (required by the 
Constitution if 100,000 signatures could be collected) to determine the method of presidential 
election. Because a legal referendum requires 50 percent voter turn-out and only 15 percent 
of the population voted in the referendum, the HSP lost its opportunity to let the people 
23 Andrew Arato, "Revolution or Restoration: On the Origins of Right-Wing Radical 
Ideology in Hungary," in Christopher G. A. Bryant and Edmund Mokrzycki, eds., The New Great 
Transformation? Change and Continuity in East-Central Europe (London: Routledge, 1994 ), 
100. 
24 Timothy Garton Ash, The Magic Lantern: The Revolution of '89 Witnessed in 
Warsaw, Budapest, Berlin, and Prague (New York: Random House, 1990), 14. 
25 Cited in Korosenyi, "The Hungarian Parliamentary Elections, 1990," in Boz6ki, et al., 
eds., Post-Communist Transition, 79, from Magyar Hirlap (10 April 1990): 1. There are also 8 
seats reserved for the national minorities: German, Slovak, Romanian, Serb, Slovenes Croatian, 
Jew, and Gypsy. See Grzybowski, "The Transition to Competitive Pluralism in Hungary," 192. 
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directly elect the President of the Republic. As the HDF and its coalition had wanted, the 
president would be chosen by the elected representatives of parliament. 
Party Number of Seats Percentage of Vote 
Hungarian Democratic Forum (HDF) 164 42.5 
Alliance of Free Democrats (AFD) 92 23.8 
Smallholders Party 44 11.4 
Hungarian Socialist Party (HSP) 33 8.6 
Alliance ofYoung Democrats (FIDESZ) 22 5.7 
Christian Democratic Party (CDP) 21 5.5 
Independents 10 2.6 
Table VI: Hungarian Parliamentary Elections Results, 1990 
The HDF and AFD, the parties receiving the majority of votes, had decided that the 
Prime Minister would be an HDF member and the President, a ceremonial position with little 
power, would be an AFD member. This decision was made without the knowledge and 
consensus of coalition partners and became an issue of heated debate. Once the names of 
Arpad Goncz, a writer and co-founder of the AFD, for President and J6zsef Antall, the 
chairman of the HDF, for Prime Minister were agreed to by the parliament, it seemed that the 
transition was well underway with the parties working together, in most cases, for the benefit 
of Hungary. Antall presented a plan of renewal that was to: (1) pursue freedom of 
individuals by removing restrictions that remained from the past; (2) ensure the state would 
be an enabling body vice an oppressive one; (3) create a social market economy with 
privatization and decollectivization of the old communist system; and ( 4) seek a retu~n to 
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Europe. 26 The plan set reasonable goals, but, in reality, the government planned to rely on 
economic recovery as the rudder that would steer Hungary on a course of successful 
transformation. 
The advantage Antall had at the time was a country that knew the communist model 
was not what they wanted-they saw that system collapse and clearly rejected it as evidenced 
by the 1990 elections-but time would be the determinate in deciding if unsuccessful policy 
could cause a move back to the left. The largest disadvantage that Antal! faced was that the 
government, the parliament, and the electorate lacked experience and had to learn while on 
the job. In this scenario, the mistakes usually are more obvious than the successes and the 
print media, which had taken a leftist stance, criticized the government on all negative issues, 
rarely giving it any credit. Another problematic issue was that Hungary was attempting to 
implement a system of true democracy that one can conclude, by looking back through 
history, was a system that Hungary had never experienced before the collapse of the 
communist system. 27 
Political cleavages exist in many areas and are creating problems between and within 
parties. The HDF, trying to walk a fine line between the opposition liberals and the coalition 
right-wing, appears to be floundering about without direction. The liberals of the AFD and 
FIDESZ are perhaps less problematic for the HDF leadership than the right-wing of its party, 
led by Istvan Csurka. Csurka published a study that was stridently nationalistic, anti-Semitic, 
critical of his party and its leadership, and advocated the government take a new direction 
based on Hungarian populist traditions. 28 The study received strong criticism from 
26 Schopflin, "From Communism to Democracy in Hungary," in Boz6ki, et al., eds., Post-
Communist Transition, 103-4. 
27 Held, "Political Cultures and Bureaucracy in Post-Communist Hungary," in Joan 
Serafin, ed., East-Central Europe in the 1990s (Boulder: Westview, 1994), 166. 
28 Discussions of Csurka and his writings can be found in: Arato, "Revolution and 
Restoration," 117; Held, Democracy and Right-Wing Politics in Eastern Europe in the 1990s 
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Hungarians and foreign nationals, including a denunciation on the floor of the US House of 
Representatives by Representative Tom Lantos, a Hungarian-American of Jewish extraction. 
The HDF was finally forced to react and did so by expelling Csurka and his right-wing faction 
and, in tum, those expelled formed the Hungarian Justice and Life Party with Csurka as its 
leader. 
The right-wing has also been vocal in their desire to restore Hungary to a position 
similar to its once great empire status before the losses of the World Wars and the 
ramifications of the Treaty of Trianon. The treaty that. was signed at the end of the First 
World War took almost three-quarters of its territory and two-thirds of its inhabitants,29 
creating a large Hungarian minority mainly in southern Slovakia, the Vojvodina area ofthe 
former Yugoslavia, and the Transylvanian region ofRomania. Hungary's government has 
been very concerned of the treatment of ethnic Hungarians in these areas, but its irredentist 
tensions have been calmed of late with improved relations with neighbors, specifically 
Slovakia and Romania. 
Besides the right-wing problems, there is also a visible break between the communists 
(former and hard-line) and other Hungarians. The backlash of anti-communism was quite 
apparent in the 1990 elections, but it does not look as if it has had a lasting impact on party 
politics as the HSP has increased its support from 11 percent of the vote in 1990 to 34 
percent in the first round of the 1994 elections. 30 Religious differences are also creating 
cleavages between the Christians and the secular liberals and socialists. The religious issue 
(New York: Columbia University Press, 1993), 109-10; Weiner, Change in Eastern Europe, 95-
96; Held, "Political Culture and the Bureaucracy in Post-Communist Hungary," 162-66; Joseph C. 
Kun, Hungarian Foreign Policy: The Experience of a New Democracy (Westport, Conn.: 
Praeger, 1993), 137-38. 
29 William L. Langer, An Encyclopedia of World History (Boston: Houghton Mifflin 
Company, 1980), 979. 
30 
"Hungary's Move to the Left," Economist, 7 May 1994, p. 57. 
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is a historic problem relating to the left-right continuum that continues to divide politicians. 
The last ofthe mainstream cleavages is that of the rural-urban divide. The electorate is split 
quite noticeably and the parties, such as the HDF (looks to represent the rural, traditional, 
Catholic Hungary), cater to these constituencies. With time, the Hungarian multi-party 
system will settle its conflicts based on these cleavages to create a party system that best 
represents the masses. 
As Hungary moved toward the 1994 elections, the HDF, which was losing its centrist 
appeal, was having problems with party and coalition disunity and poor approval rating. The 
first problem came when portions of the Smallholders Party left the coalition as a result of its 
inability for quick redistribution of collectivized lands, as the Smallholders had promised while 
campaigning. The economic problems of Hungary have not improved, and therefore the 
average Hungarian is not experiencing an economic miracle or even better living conditions, 
resulting in fond memories for the times that they experienced during the days of "Goulash 
Communism. "31 The vocal right-wing has discredited the party's ability to govern and 
Csurka's continued attacks on the health of Prime Minister Antall, who struggled with cancer 
until his death in December 1993, had hurt the confidence thatthe people held for the party 
fearing the leadership shake-up after his death. 
As the HDF struggled with the economy in 1994 and improved unemployment and 
inflation numbers, the HSP, with its promises of better conditions for all Hungarians under 
its leadership and the support of the old party nomenklatura or red bourgeoisie (those that 
prospered economically in the early 1990s because of their position in the former communist 
structure), was able to come to power via the ballot and soap box, means alien to its 
forebears. 32 The HSP would receive one-third of the popular vote and a majority, or 54 
percent, of the seats in parliament, with Gyula Horn, known to many as the Hungarian 
31 Jonathan Surley, "Back to the Future," National Review, 21 June 1994, p. 18. 
32 Ibid., 18-20. 
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Foreign Minister in 1989 that brought down the Iron Curtain between Hungary and Austria, 
as the country's new Prime Minister. 33 The AFD received about the same percentage as in 
1990 with 20 percent, the HDF swapped places with the HSP receiving 12 percent, and 
Csurka's right-wingers did not sent any representatives to parliament as it failed to meet the 
required 5 percent minimum vote. 34 With this new left of center government, the concerns 
are not of a return to communist-styled censorship and collectivism, but that measures will 
prevent the emergence of a true middle-class and set a course that will take Hungary down 
a path closer to the transitions of Latin America than Southern Europe. 
2. Decentralizing the Markets 
Rather than promoting a "shock therapy" program similar to Poland or the former 
Czechoslovakia, Hungary implemented a more gradual liberalization of the economy as it 
moved toward capitalism from the centralized "market socialism" of the communist era. 
"Although they were only half-measures, the reforms implemented after 1968 had destroyed 
central planning and created a far more decentralized economy with a semi-market price 
system, a network of commercial banks, and a value-added tax. "35 The gradual liberalization 
approach, supported by the Antall government and the HDF, was favored over the "shock 
therapy" method because the risk of adverse social and political consequences, as a result the 
inability of different sectors of the population to adjust to the rapidly changing economic 
conditions, was too high. In its approach to capitalism, the government of a centralized 
economy must look at three main parts of privatization: "(1) the small-scale privatization of 
33 Istvan Deak, "Post-Post-Communist Hungary," The New York Times Review of Books, 
11 August 1994, pp. 33-37. · 
34 Bob Dent, "Letters from Budapest," New Statesman & Society, 20 May 1994, p. 11. 
35 Ivan T. Berend, "Hungary: Eastern Europe's Hope?" Current History 91, no. 568 
(November 1992): 381. 
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shops, restaurants, etc.; (2) large-scale privatization of state enterprises; and (3) the 
reprivatization of property to former owners. "36 Each of these parts occurred in the 
Hungarian privatization process. 
Small, private businesses grew rapidly in Hungary during the 1980s producing about 
one-third ofthe GDP, and the government's privatization of this sector after 1980 was slow. 
The privatization of the small business sector has not been a high priority as the government 
has looked to the higher-value large business and industry sectors for producing cash for the 
indebted country. In addition, the slow process could be a result of the positive impact that 
the existing small, private and state, businesses, particularly in the service sector, have had on 
the country's economy-some 50,000 private firms that began between 1989 and 1992 
produced approximately 50 percent of 1992 GDP. 37 In addition, in 1992 about 80 percent 
of Hungarian goods were sold to free market countries, with 50 percent going to EU 
countries. The reforms since 1968 did create a group of business-oriented individuals that 
have helped to sustain the country during a very trying economic transformation. 
A larger issue that has slowed the transfer of small business is the reprivatization of 
properties confiscated by the communists during their reign. The 1992 laws requiring that 
original owners or heirs receive their confiscated property or fair compensation for that 
property has caused confusion within an already complex system of property rights in this 
sector and tension, both economic and political, that threaten to compromise the privatization 
campaign. 38 Restitution becomes a difficult process for a government with little money in its 
treasury and creates a conflict between the claimant and the government when it is 
36 Vic Duke and Keith Grime, "Privatization in East-Central Europe: Similarities and 
Contrasts in its Application," in Bryant and Mokrzycki, The New Great Transformation?, 146. 
37 Berend, "Hungary: Eastern Europe's Hope?" 382. 
38 Duke and Grime, "Privatization in East-Central Europe," 154. 
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detennining the value of claims on businesses and lands that were confiscated over 40 years 
ago and no longer exist or cannot be reclaimed. 
The first large-scale privatization deal was recorded in December 1989 when a 
majority stake in the Tungram enterprise was sold to General Electric for $150 million. 39 As 
other Western companies did the same, the Hungarian government reacted by creating the 
State Property Agency (SPA) to oversee the sale of all state entities. This was in response 
to the uneasiness of all the foreign companies investing in the Hungarian market, leaving few 
companies in the hands of Hungarians. To keep the entire process above board, each 
transaction carried out by the SPA must be made public and is closed only after open 
competition among interested bidders is finalized. 40 The system has helped to keep some 
companies under Hungarian ownership, but Western capital and influence have been a major 
factor in the Hungarian privatization process to date. 
Through the process, GDP has declined over 10 percent and unemployment reached 
a high of 13.6 percent in February 1993, most ofwhich can be directly attributed to the global 
recession and the collapse of the former Soviet and Eastern Bloc trade relationships. 41 But, 
in the same period, the Hungarian currency, the forint, became fully convertible, over 1, 000 
state-owned enterprises have been privatized, and farmland from collective farms are being 
auctioned for private ownership.42 Foreign investment through 1992 was about $5 billion, 
with investment by some of the largest transnational companies like General Electric, General 
39 Duke and Grime, "Privatization in East-Central Europe," 154. 
40 Yudit Kiss, "Privatisation in Hungary-Two Years Later," Soviet Studies 44, no. 6 
(1992): 1019. 
41 Ruth A. Bandzak, "The Role of Labor in Post-Socialist Hungary," Journal of 
Economic Issues 28, no. 2 (June 1994): 519-32. 
42 Michta, The Government and Politics of Postcommunist Europe, 62. 
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Motors, Philips, Ford, Suzuki, Nestle, Unilever, and Opel. ~3 Hungary, when compared to 
Poland or the former Czechoslovakia, has proceeded the furthest down the road to a 
privatized, capitalistic economy, and, in doing so, has shown how difficult a transformation 
it is. 44 With the HSP taking control of the economy, Finance Minister Laszlo Bekesi, a 
radical, former communist reformer that is reassuming the position he held before the 1990 
elections, is likely to put an austerity program in place that may even surprise some of the 
Liberals. 45 This will help Hungary as it continues to seek a capitalistic democracy. 
3. Social Modification 
The formation of a free society in Hungary is dependent on the people and the success 
of economic transition. The transition experiences from the market-oriented economic 
reforms and the political liberalization have promoted a progressively more flexible 
relationship between state and society from 1970 on and especially since 1989. 46 The key to 
a civilized society is the action of the people within it, an occurrence that was quite limited 
and not effectively pursued in communist Hungary during the Kadar period. What were 
considered to be the local governments and organizations for the people were actually 
representatives of the central communist authorities-these local bodies were assigned the 
task of the reinforcement of communist control over society. 47 As changes began to take 
43 Berend, "Hungary: Eastern Europe's Hope?" 382. 
44 Duke and Grime, "Privatization in East-Central Europe," 156. 
45 Deak, "Post-Post-Communist Hungary," 37. 
46 Yanqi Tong, "State, Society, and Political Change in China and Hungary," 
Comparative Politics 26 (April1994): 333-53. 
47 Held, "Building Civil Society in Post-Communist Hungary," in Held, ed., Democracy 
and Right-Wing Politics in Eastern Europe in the 1990s (New York: Columbia University Press, 
1993), 138. 
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place, the people became aware of the corruption that was associated with this societal 
organization under the communist government. 
As the new government coalition under the HDF took over in May 1990, it was able 
to pass legislation that provided clear direction to the management of municipalities, 
education, social welfare, and other benefits and pensions; however, legislative inconsistencies 
soon became apparent as a result of multiple legislation dealing in overlapping areas. 
Increased unemployment caused by the privatization process and legislative confusion caused 
many Hungarians to favor a reemergence of the socialist ideals of "social justice in terms of 
equality, social security, strong state intervention, and limitations imposed on individual 
economic incentives and profit orientation. "48 This stance is not considered to be that of the 
fanner communist "market socialism," but a softer "democratic socialism" with protection for 
the impoverished through better institutions providing social policy, less unemployment 
through job training, and better quality education for children and workers through a 
revamped education system. 
One of the best advances for workers in Hungary was the rewritten Labor Code that 
went into practice in 1992. The Code is modeled after the German labor laws with the 
implementation of"work councils" fanned at the employers expense to represent the workers 
in negotiations and discussions with management. The Code provides for items such as: ( 1) 
protection for workers against discrimination on account of sex, age, nationality, race, 
extraction, religion, or political belief; (2) 24 weeks of maternity leave; (3) two years leave 
to care for sick family members; and ( 4) 20 days paid vacation and ten days of sick leave at 
three-quarters pay. The Code also encourages companies to enhance workers' skills, 
education, and training to facilitate the reallocation of labor required by economic 
restructuring. The Ministry of Labor believes that the Labor Code is important for workers 
48 Antal Orkeny and Gyorgy Csepeli, "Social Change, Political Beliefs, and Everyday 
Expectations in Hungarian Society: A Comparative View," in Janos M. Kovacs, ed., Transition 
to Capitalism? The Communist Legacy in Eastern Europe (New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction, 
1994), 264. 
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but they must also understand that in a market economy, unlike the socialist economy of 
communist Hungary, will not provide full employment. ~9 
At present, with the political transition complete, the social changes needed to 
generate real civil society in Hungary appear to be hinged to the successful outcome of a 
privatized market economy. The people do believe in a market economy based on what the 
know ofthe West and the result of the economic transformations is expected to yield social 
mobility and equality of opportunity. There must also be a removal of the concept of state-
socialism that burdens many Hungarians into believing that only the educated, young 
urbanites can prosper in a market economy. The idea of helplessness, disorganization, and 
subsidization must be replaced with development of skilled workers and entrepreneurs within 
a motivated, meritocratic-oriented, and self-reliant population. 50 
There is no better time than the present for Hungary as the West, both in Europe and 
across the Atlantic, are emerging from recession with open markets that can absorb 
Hungarian goods and help to further develop its markets and society with financial and 
technological support. With the recent move politically to a government that is left of center, 
it is difficult to predict the outcome of future economic and social progress. 
4. International Acceptance 
Hungarian foreign policy since 1990 has been aimed at gaining entrance into Western 
European political, economic, and security organizations. "In its relations with the West, 
Hungary enjoyed the advantage of an established good reputation, and was the first of the 
49 Bandzak, "The Role of Labor in Post-Socialist Hungary," 527-30. 
50 Orkeny and Csepeli, "Social Change, Political Beliefs, and Everyday Expectations in 
Hungarian Society," 272. 
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post-communist states to be admitted to full membership ofthe Council ofEurope-" 51 This 
was the first step toward Europe in Hungary's search for quick ties to the West and regional 
cooperation was also sought as a method of becoming more attractive to the Western 
institutions. Hungary was one of the founding members in 1989 of the Pentagonale, which 
also included Austria, Yugoslavia, Italy, and Czechoslovakia. Poland later joined and the 
organization became known as the Central European Initiative, but, after the split of 
Czechoslovakia and the disintegration of Yugoslavia, the organization's future remains 
uncertain. 52 
Prime Minister Antal! pushed for EU membership from the early days of his 
governments ascendancy to power in 1990. For his efforts, Hungary gained associate 
membership in November 1991 and hopes to have full membership by 2000. The EU has 
been important in helping Hungary to establish a strong market economy with an efficient 
institutional infrastructure and strengthen the fundamental elements of its democracy in areas 
such as the rule of law, human rights, pluralism, the multi-party system, and free and fair 
elections. 53 Hungary's transformation process has outpaced other Eastern European countries 
and has received much economic assistance, in the form of aids and loans, from the EU, 
OECD, IMF, World Bank, and individual Western countries. With this assistance and its 
associate status, Hungary believes that it is well on its way to full integration and acceptance 
in the European community of nations. 
51 Judy Batt, "The International Dimension of Democratisation in Czechoslovakia and 
Hungary," in Geoffrey Pridharn, Eric Herring, and George Sanford, eds., Building Democracy? 
The International Dimension of Democratisation in Eastern Europe (London: Leicester 
University Press, 1994), 178. 
52 Kun, Hungarian Foreign Policy, 123. 
53 John Pinder, "The European Community and Democracy in Central and Eastern 
Europe," in Pridharn, et al., eds., Building Democracy?, 124-25. 
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Since the dissolution ofthe Warsaw Pact in June 1991, Hungary has been seeking 
NATO membership. Measures have been put in place to depoliticize the military and it has 
been put under the control of the Hungarian Minister of Defense, Lajos Fur, a civilian and 
founding member ofthe HDF. Fur, taking the Ministry in May 1990, has restructured the 
military as a national defense force and implemented a doctrine that has become law allowing 
the military to train only for the purposes of defending Hungarian territory, except for 
peacekeeping missions authorized by parliament. 54 These moves and diplomatic persistence 
caused NATO to establish the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) in November 
1991 as a link between NATO and the former Warsaw Pact countries and to announce in May 
1992 at the NATO Oslo meeting that NATO widened its mandate to include the use of troops 
and equipment for peacekeeping outside the borders of NATO countries. Hungary 
interpreted this as the extension of a "security umbrella" that no entity, like the CSCE or 
NACC, other than NATO could provide effectively. 55 
Hunga.rfs position on providing its security has been a priority and is apparent by its 
desire for membership in the EU and NATO. Hungary also participates in the CSCE and 
maintains good relations with non-warring neighbors, while also seeking military exchanges 
with countries such as France and the United States. To expand on its NACC program, 
NATO, at the January 1994 meeting in Brussels, unveiled the "Partnership for Peace" plan 
that allows for broader cooperation by including all the countries of the former Soviet Union 
and Warsaw Pact. This expansion to include Russia was an obvious move to respect the 
great power and influence that Russia still has in Eastern Europe. 56 As the late NATO 
54 Michta, The Government and Politics of Post-Communist Europe, 66. 
55 Kun, Hungarian Foreign Policy, 124. 
56 Michta, The Government and Politics of Post-Communist Europe, 212-13. 
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Secretary General Manfred Woerner said concerning moving NATO eastward, it "will make 
sense only if it results in the enhancement of European security, not its deterioration." 57 
With the recent elections that brought the HSP to power, it is impossible to predict 
where Hungarian foreign policy will go or if the new government will seek to participate in 
Europe as did the former HDF government. The HSP government has placed multiple 
obstacles in front ofHungarian membership in NATO, but has not made similar comments 
concerning further integration into the EU or its military arm, the WEU. 58 If the goal of a 
capitalistic democracy is desired, then most likely the current path that Hungary is following 
would lead Hungary to further involvement in the institutions and organizations of Western 
Europe. The will of the people changed to government, and one must hope, for their sake, 
that the decision they made at the ballot box was the one that will take all Hungarians where 
they want to go. 
57 Cited iriMichta, The Government and Politics of Post-Communist Europe, 213, from 
Manfred Woerner, "Kotwica Europy," Wprost, 9 January 1994, p. 48. 




The similar occurrences of change that Spain and Hungary have undergone in the 
twentieth century and, more specifically during their transitions, have been quite amazing and 
have led to the study of Spain as a model of democratic and capitalistic institutionalization. 
For this reason, these occurrences, whether of a similar or dissimilar nature, will be discussed 
as a precursor to understanding whether Spain's case.is a model for Hungary. The first of the 
similarities relates to the beginnings ofthe authoritarian regimes, when General Franco and 
the communists secured power in their respective countries. In Spain, Franco's means of 
ascending to power was by defeating the elected Third Republic government, while the 
Hungarians saw communism take power from the disintegrating Smallholders Party in 
questionable elections overseen by the Soviet Red Army. Once in power, Franco instituted 
a rightist authoritarian dictatorship and Hungary, after the 1956 Revolution, experienced 
Kadar's leftist communist dictatorship. A dissimilarity is present in that each regime had a 
power base in opposing wings of the political spectrum, but the power and control that each 
wielded within society was unquestioned. 
To maintain order without the continuing and obvious use of force or repression, each 
regime saw the necessity of economic reform. Both Spain and Hungary allowed economic 
liberalization policies to be implemented that resulted in increases to the quality of life of most 
of their subjects. With the economic change, the people saw an opportunity for social 
liberalization which was not an aspect of the economic reforms that the regime's had expected 
or wanted. Franco slowed the social progress by striking out against the areas that were 
expressing too much freedom, thus showing the rest of the population that some of the new 
liberties would be tolerated but they must be exercised in moderation. In Hungary, the 
government attempted to reverse the trend, but found that it had progressed too far· and 
excessive force would be required to squelch the liberalization. The result of the economic 
reforms was the growth of a weak middle-class-although much better developed in Spain 
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than in Hungary-and a process which eroded and weakened the political stability of the 
authoritarian regimes in each country. The Spanish experiment better prepared the 
constituency for the transition, as it was a real capitalistic, free market economy with some 
protectionism; whereas in Hungary, there were two economies, one based on the Soviet-
styled centralism and the other based on an underground-styled black market of double 
employment and small home businesses. The liberalization in each country caused the two 
soft authoritarian dictatorship countries to pick up nicknames: Spain became known as 
Europe's "fa~ade democracy," while Hungary's governing style became known in the Eastern 
bloc as "goulash communism." 
The transition phases began after the death of an significant institution. In Spain, that 
institution was the death of the leader, General Franco, and in Hungary, it was the death of 
hard-line, secretive communism as Soviet President Gorbachev began his campaign of 
perestroika and glasnost. The subsequent leaders of both countries, Spain's Arias and 
Hungary's Grosz, were carryovers from the old regimes that did not realize that the 
transformations that their countries were about to undertake would move so quickly that they 
would be left behind. In the first free elections, no one party could win a majority thus 
requiring a coalition be formed to carry out the process of changing their countries. In 
addition, the transition phases was completed by each country's electorate voting the party 
that led the transition, Spain's UCD and Hungary's HDF, out of office in favor of a party that 
was politically left of center, the PSOE in Spain and the HSP in Hungary. 
The most important of the contrasting occurrences of the two countries are the 
following. The first is a result of the economic transformation in which Spain developed 
highly influential and effective trade unions that were able to work with the parties and 
government to assist the transition by improving working conditions and salaries. In 
Hungary, the trade unions that did develop were not considered to be effective nor did .they 
have the support or confidence of the working public to be beneficial to the cause of workers. 
The Spanish middle-class was better prepared for the changes that Madrid instituted and was 
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able to proceed through the transition phase with little governmental intervention by a 
government that was overwhelmed by the burdens of organizing a stable political 
infrastructure. Spain was not forced to deal with the privatization or decollectivization of the 
entire centralized economic structure of the country as was the case in Hungary, thereby 
requiring the government to show as much or more attention to the issues of developing a 
stable capitalist economy as to developing a stable pluralistic democracy. The level or 
intensity of involvement in making the changes necessary in Hungary far outreached those of 
Spain. 
Other areas of contrast were those of the Church and the armed forces. In Hungary, 
the Church played a passive role providing support to neither side, whereas the Church in 
Spain actively supported the opposition of the Franco regime and committed itself to the 
democratic transformation. The Church also sought to influence the drafters of the 
Constitution of 1978 in specific areas that Church leaders felt it should maintain its positive 
role of influencing Spanish society. When looking at the armed forces, the Hungarian case 
was much simpler since the military hierarchy immediately swore their allegiance to the 
elected government. In Spain, the process was very difficult and required all the tact and skill 
of the King and Prime Minister to maintain control of the armed forces. Even with all the 
time and effort spent negotiating with and briefing the military, one coup d'etat was attempted 
in February 1981 and two others were thwarted before taking shape. This problem of a semi-
loyal group of officers within the Spanish Armed Forces was such a threat that it caused the 
PSOE to implement a comprehensive restructuring of the forces under the control of a civilian 
Minister of Defense once they assumed power in 1982. 
King Juan Carlos had no counterpart of equal stature in Hungary that played an 
equivalent role. He made it clear in his coronation speech that changes were going to begin 
in Spain and, thereafter, did everything in his power to ensure that the transition proce~ded 
in a manner to his liking. The King's relationship with the military and his involvement in 
removing the hard-line Franquist military hierarchy was paramount to keeping the peace when 
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reforms moved rapidly and often countered the desires of some of the military leadership. 
Prime Minister Suarez' announcement of the legalization of the PCE, the very party that 
supported the Loyalists ofthe Third Republic, or their enemy of the civil war was the most 
important case. The King also represented a change from the 36 years of dictatorship that 
had smothered many freedoms of Spaniards and had smashed their freely elected government 
during the Spanish Civil War. There was no individual in Hungary that could restore their 
memory ofthe glory days of the Hungarian Empire before the devastating losses of the two 
World Wars. 
Perhaps the most important aspect of the Spanish transition that is not seen in 
Hungary was the elite settlement and its ability to negotiate an acceptable consensus for the 
benefit of the people and the nation of Spain. The elites, most importantly the political elites, 
worked together, across party lines and ideology, to reach the best result for the new Spanish 
democracy. Examples are present in every phase and found in nearly every decision that was 
made as the institutions were developed, like the Law for Political Reform, the Constitution, 
and the Pacts of Moncloa. This elite settlement allowed for participation by the parties 
through designated representatives in an atmosphere that fostered friendship and camaraderie, 
and more importantly it placed decision makers in a comfortable setting where agreements 
could be reached without overbearing pressure and exhaustive numbers of varying opinions. 
The foundation of the democratic system in Spain required that issues that polarized 
and divided the Spanish society, including the elites themselves, be decided mutually among 
few elites and for the people as a whole. For the system to represent all the people fairly, the 
only answer was to join left, right and center, incumbents and formerly clandestine opposition, 
monarchists and republicans, as one Spanish political unit. With the forces from the top 
determined to work together and the masses mobilized in support of change from below, the 
outcome could only be an organization that would provide the Spanish people w\th a 
government that truly serves its people. For Spain, the elite settlement was an unusual event 
that happened within the right circumstances, with the right people, at the right time; or one 
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seeking an answer to how this all occurred might respond like Richard Gunther did by 
presuming that the Spanish transition to democracy suggests that something else existed that 
confounds systematic analysis, that being luck. 1 
It does not appear that Hungary has received its bit of luck yet. The problems of 
transforming all the institutions and infrastructure of a country in a short period of time is 
extremely difficult and takes years, maybe even decades. The elites that assumed the 
leadership roles in Hungary did not work across party lines and, in many cases, they did not 
work with fellow members of their own party. Examples are many, but one showing how the 
parties did not working together is represented by the inability of the parties to decide on how 
the President of the Hungarian Republic would be elected, and one showing interparty 
problems is represented by the internal accusations and harassment that went on in the HDF 
between the Antall-led center and the Csurka-led right-wing. To date, the ruling political 
elites have not shown any movement toward working with opposition parties, groups, or 
coalitions in order to achieve consensual legislation. 
The Spanish case does not lend itself to the situation in Hungary. Despite the 
similarities, major points have occurred differently and Hungary is forced to deal with issues 
with which Spain did not have to contend. The future of each of these countries is difficult 
to predict; however, it is easier to look at Spain and see that its prospects for continued 
success are more certain. As the global recession begins to ease, Spain's economy should 
once again flourish and help prepare the country's economy for further European integration 
and competition. With the events that have occurred on Western Europe's eastern borders 
since 1989 and the global recession that has caused economic problems throughout the EU, 
it is likely that the EUs integration timetables-whether any of the Central or Eastern 
European countries are allowed membership-will have to be delayed from its original 
schedule. As for Hungary, the rebounding economies to its west can only help economic 
development, but the stability of the governmental institutions now depends on how well the 
1 Gunther, "Spain: The Very Model ofthe Modern Elite Settlement," 77. 
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former communist reformers of the HSP lead the country. If stability is achieved in both the 
sociopolitical and socioeconomic sectors ofthe country, further partnerships or integration 
with Europe and the West can be expected. Membership to the EU will come to the former 
Visegrad countries (Hungary, Poland, and Czech Republic) before they can expect 
membership to NATO, even if the HSP plans to remove the hurdles that they have placed in 
front ofNATO membership. If stability prevails, Hungary is on the path to a successful and 
prosperous future as a member of Europe, even if that path is not modeled after the successful 
transition and consolidation in Spain. 
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